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Abstract
This Article discusses the main European Community (“EC”) antitrust law issues that have
arisen in the media industries or which are especially relevant to media. Part I discusses gen-
eral principles and directives that influence multimedia law. Part II examines the relevant markets
which relate to multimedia. Part III reviews evidence of dominance within multimedia. Part IV
discusses the impact multimedia has had upon broadcasting sports events within the European
Union (“EU”). Part IV also considers film catalogues and performing rights societies. Part V ex-
plores mergers within the media sector. Part VI discusses conditional access systems. Finally, the
Article concludes that the European media industry has yet to fully comprehend the interrelation-
ship of media and EC Antitrust law. Therefore, the issues presented and discussed throughout this
Article will continue to appear throughout the courts of the Member States.
MEDIA, MULTIMEDIA, AND EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY ANTITRUST LAW
John Temple Lang*
"Europe is littered with scrapped media alliances .... ,
"[T]he distinction between stars (who have always been al-
lowed to behave badly) and senior managers (who are sup-
posed to exercise self-restraint) was more or less abolished." 2
INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses the main European Community
("EC") antitrust law issues that have arisen in the media indus-
tries or which are especially relevant to media. The media dis-
cussed here are cinema; radio; television, including cable, satel-
lite, and terrestrial; videos and sound recordings; multimedia
and the Internet; newspapers; and magazines. In due course,
on-line film delivery will become another medium. In fact,
much of this Article concerns television and performing rights
because that is where most money is spent in European media,
where the latest developments are occurring, and where most
antitrust issues and cases have arisen. Multimedia refers to serv-
ices that provide more than two kinds of data, either images,
text, video, or audio, through the same apparatus and which al-
low viewers to interact with that data.
This Article is limited to analyzing antitrust issues arising in
current cases, and will not consider the many other legal aspects
of media operations, including state subsidies to public broad-
casting. There are many more issues and arguments that have
arisen in Community media cases than have been dealt with in
formal judgments or decisions. Some allegations are summa-
rized here, which on examination, may prove to be exaggerated
or unjustified, at least in some cases.
* Director in the Competition Directorate General-European Commission; Pro-
fessor, Trinity College, Dublin. Opinions expressed are purely personal. A version of
this Article will appear in 1997 FoRDtAm CoRP. L. INST. (Barry Hawk ed., 1998). Copy-
right © Transnational Series Publication, Inc. 1998.
1. Edmund L. Andrews, The Media Business, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1997, at D4.
2. Mark Canton, The Nightmare Continues, ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1996, at 67.
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This Article consists of several parts. Part I discusses general
principles and directives that influence multimedia law. Part II
examines the relevant markets which relate to multimedia. Part
III reviews evidence of dominance within multimedia. Part 1V
discusses the impact multimedia has had upon broadcasting
sports events within the European Union ("EU"). Part 1V also
considers film catalogues and performing rights societies. Part V
explores mergers within the media sector. Part VI discusses con-
ditional access systems. Finally, the Article concludes that the
European media industry has yet to fully comprehend the inter-
relationship of media and EC Antitrust law. Therefore, the is-
sues presented and discussed throughout this Article will con-
tinue to appear throughout the courts of the Member States.
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF PRINCIPAL MEDIA IN EUROPE
In Europe, both the principal television stations and princi-
pal radio stations originated as state-owned monopoly services.
Many important broadcasting companies are still state-owned,
and traditionally have been regarded as public services. Some
television stations, however, are financed wholly or partly by li-
cence fees, others wholly or largely by advertising, and other
newer stations by pay-TV or viewers' subscriptions.
Television and radio stations in Europe are mostly national
in coverage and in their audiences, primarily because of linguis-
tic reasons. These stations are subject to national regulations,
but relatively few Community measures. Consequently, most Eu-
ropean media markets are national, even though some of the
companies are worldwide and, as is technically possible, the
same television picture is transmitted with soundtracks in several
languages.
Within each Member State of the EU, there is one or more
large national broadcasting corporation, and a variety of private,
regional, or local stations.
Media markets in Europe include a wide variety of different
types of participants, many of whom are obliged to maintain
commercial or technical relationships with others. For example,
in the television sector there are cable, terrestrial, and satellite
broadcasting companies, companies owning satellites, program
producers, advertisers and publicity companies, intermediaries
selling the right to broadcast sports events, sponsors, viewers,
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sports organizations, stadium owners, film studios with film port-
folios, and companies that measure audience ratings.' A broad-
caster who broadcasts music videos provides services to video
producers, advertisers, and to viewers. Many of the relationships
between these types of companies involve a degree of mutual
dependence, which creates tensions and complicates antitrust
analysis. This means that a single case can involve reciprocal
provisions of different kinds of services in different service mar-
kets.
The last two decades witnessed an increase in the liberaliza-
tion of television services. This was due partly to Community
law and, simultaneously, to a vast increase in the number of tele-
vision channels due to digitalization and the growth of condi-
tional access technology and pay-television, which involves either
cables that can be used also for special interest offerings, for on-
line and interactive services, or encryption and decoding. These
factors have vastly increased the amount of money involved in
the industry, and have also increased competition for advertising
revenue. These factors have made antitrust issues more impor-
tant than before, and are leading to an increased number of TV
channels specializing in sports.4 Most European TV channels,
public or private, are still analogue, free to air, and financed by
licence fees or advertising. Pay TV, and therefore, conditional
access systems, have become important.
Regulation of media in Europe has been largely national.
There is no European equivalent of the United States' Federal
Communications Commission ("F.C.C."). Apart from the EC Di-
rectives mentioned below, there has been national legislation in
various Member States to maintain State or regional public mo-
nopolies; to ensure diversity of ownership and control; political
impartiality and local content; to limit cross-media ownership;
and to oblige publicly owned broadcasters to obtain a minimum
proportion of their programs from sources outside the broad-
casting corporation itself. States also have restricted advertising
of products such as cigarettes and alcohol. There are rules simi-
3. See Commission Decision No. 93/668/EEC, O.J. L 306/50, at 137-138 (1993)
[hereinafter Auditel]; Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia v. Dimotiki Etairia
Pliroforissis, Case 260/89, [1991] 1 E.C.R. 2925, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 540.
4. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1992, at 83-84 (1993).
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lar to the pre-1987 F.C.C.'s Fairness doctrine.5 In other words,
national authorities have regulated the media for a wide variety
of purposes, much wider than the limited purposes dealt with by
Community Directives on television.6 Regulatory definitions of
broadcasting and of telecommunications have not yet been mod-
ified to deal with new technology.
Economically, today's media involve content, carriage, and
software, but the companies involved no longer fall neatly into
any of these three categories because there is much conver-
gence. Antitrust problems arise when a company which is domi-
nant in one of these areas makes use of or extends its domi-
nance into another area of specialty, especially by a joint venture
with another company which is itself dominant in the second
area.
Although television and, to a lesser extent, radio, have been
regulated, other media have been largely unregulated. In addi-
tion to formal regulation, state-owned television stations have in
practice been influenced by official views on cultural issues of
various kinds. Until recently, television has been regarded much
less as a business in Europe than in the United States. Television
is seen as a public service and means of entertainment, but not
as a business like any other business. European cable television
companies regard themselves as more advanced in conditional
access technology, essential for pay-TV, than U.S. cable compa-
nies.
The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, not to
be confused with the Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nity in Luxembourg, has ruled that broadcasting is covered by
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, gov-
erning freedom of expression,7 and that only restrictions al-
5. Id.
6. Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market - An Assessment of
the Need for Community Action: Green Paper from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament, COM (92) 480 Final (1993); Eric Barendt, Towards a
European Media Law?, MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. & COMP. L. 41, 41-55 (1994); Vereinigte
Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- Und Vertriebs GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag, Case C-
368/95, [1997] E.C.R. -, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 1329.
7. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5. Article 10 of European Convention
on Human Rights states that
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall in-
clude freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
1998] 1299
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lowed by Article 10 of that Convention are permissible.8 These
restrictions apparently do not permit broadcasting monopolies.9
In federal states, the power to regulate media may belong to
the regions or may be shared between the federal government
and the regions. Several EU Member States such as Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain, are federations or have re-
gions with so much power that they are similar to federations.
As regulated markets become more competitive, whether due to,
or in spite of, regulation, it will be necessary progressively to re-
lax regulatory rules. Because of this, antitrust law will become
more important.
Technological change now makes it possible to provide
point-to-point telephone service, content services, and informa-
tion services through the same network. It is also now possible
to provide content services on a point-to-point basis for video-on-
demand, as distinct from traditional point-to-multi-point broad-
casting.
There is still some uncertainty, how much is disputed, over
whether private households' total expenditure on media will
grow much; whether Internet will replace broadband communi-
cations in the foreseeable future; and how far subscriber pay TV
will replace free television, whether publicly or commercially fi-
nanced.
In analyzing media antitrust issues in Europe, apart from
the usual need to identify the relevant market discussed below, it
is useful to distinguish between:
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcast-
ing, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and re-
sponsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Id.
8. Autronic, Informationsverein Lentia v. Switzerland, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
485 (1990); Groppera v. Switzerland, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 321 (1990).
9. Id. It has also been suggested that it would be contrary to the Convention to
take away from sporting bodies the right to sell exclusive rights to broadcast major
events. This would be the effect of national legislation obliging them to make the rele-
vant broadcasting rights available to public interest channels.
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" content;
* programs, whether current or archive material, and
whether produced in-house or commissioned;
" channels, series of radio or television programs broadcast
on the same frequency, and whether general or thematic;
" means of delivery, terrestrial, satellite direct-to-home, satel-
lite via cable, each carrying either analogue or digital sig-
nals;
* encrypted or free access signals; and
" reception equipment owned by viewers or rented from
cable companies.
There are major differences between EU Member States. In
Germany, for example, seventeen million households, fifty-one
percent of the total, are connected to cable. This is a much
higher proportion than in any other Member State. This means
that German cable television subscribers can see many channels
without paying the extra cost of pay-TV. Germany is also unu-
sual because Deutsche Telekom, the dominant telecommunica-
tions company, controls the national cable network.
Media markets in Europe are changing rapidly in many
ways. This means that findings by antitrust authorities about rel-
evant markets may become obsolete and unreliable. It also
means that individual exemptions under Article 85(3) should
not be given for long periods, as the future is so hard to foresee.
Penetration of personal computers ("PC"), into households
is still on average much less in Europe, eighteen percent in 1994,
than in the United States, thirty-seven percent in 1996. Because
not every PC has a modem, this has consequences for use of the
Internet and, therefore, for the importance of the Internet in
multimedia services available and utilized in Europe.
A. Free Movement of Goods
EC Treaties require free movement of goods, but allow re-
strictions on imports on grounds of public morality and the pro-
tection of industrial and commercial property. The case law on
intellectual property, insofar as it is relevant to media, may be
summarized as follows.
Protection of intellectual property rights is given largely by
national law. The main exception is the Convention on the Eu-
19981 1301
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ropean Patent.' ° These laws have not been fully harmonized,
and there are significant differences between them.
B. Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights
The Court has repeatedly held that intellectual property
rights throughout the EC are exhausted by the marketing of
goods by the owner of the right to the goods or by the owner's
consent in any Member State. In this situation, the owner can-
not use its rights to prevent the goods from being imported into
another Member State, or to insist on receiving an additional
royalty on the imported goods.11
The principle of exhaustion, however, does not apply to
performance rights - that is, the right of owners of copyright or
the equivalent to receive payment for public performance of the
copyright material. The owner of the copyright may grant a li-
cence for a certain number of performances in one EC Member
State, and may also authorize television broadcasting of a film in
that State. A copyright owner has a right to require fees for any
public performances. If a licence has been granted for only one
Member State, the licensee has no right to broadcast or perform
it in another State. Also, fees must be paid for any performance
or transmission by cable companies, not covered by the first li-
cence. Thus, a copyright owner may require cable television
companies in one State to pay fees or royalties for transmitting
its film even if the television companies received the film from a
television station in another Member State that was duly licenced
to broadcast it there.1 2
10. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market of 15 December
1975, O.J. L 17/1 (1976), amended by the Implementing Regulations to the Conven-
tion for the European Patent for the Common Market, Oj. L. 401/28 (1989). The as
yet unenacted Community Patent Convention would provide for a single patent effec-
tive throughout Europe.
11. Musik-Vetrieb Membran v. GEMA, Joined Cases 55 and 57/80, [1981] E.C.R.
147, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 44; Ministere Public v. Tournier, Case 241-242/88, [1989]
E.C.R. 2521, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 248.
12. Coditel v. Cine-Vog Films, Case 62/79, [1980] E.C.R. 881, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R.
362 [hereinafter Coditel I]; See also Coditel v. Cine-Vog Films, Case 262/81, [1982]
E.C.R. 11-3381, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 49 [hereinafter Coditel I]; G. Basset v. Societe des
auteurs, compositeurs et editeurs de musique (SACEM), Case 402/85, [1987] E.C.R.
1747, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 173. The mere fact that a licence is issued only for a given
geographical area and that the given area is a Member State does not make the limita-
tion unlawful. The Court warned performing rights societies about the Community's
antitrust rules:
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The future relevance to both music and films on the In-
ternet is obvious, even if nobody has yet given a licence to put
feature films on the Internet. This also explains why there is a
separate performing rights society in each Member State.
The mere fact that an exclusive copyright licence has been
given for a limited period is not enough to bring the licence
within Article 85, although the exercise of copyright rights and
the terms of copyright licences can fall under Article 85 and Arti-
cle 86.
The sale of goods outside the EC and European Economic
Area ("E.E.A."), including Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein,
does not exhaust intellectual property rights in the Community
or the E.E.A.1" If intellectual property rights, however, were
used to support a market-allocation arrangement contrary to EC
antitrust law, these rights would not be exercisable to achieve
Although copyright in a film and the right deriving from it, namely that of
exhibiting the film, are not, therefore, as such subject to the prohibitions con-
tained in Article 85, the exercise of those rights may, none the less, come
within the said prohibitions where there are economic or legal circumstances
the effect of which is to restrict film distribution to an appreciable degree or to
distort competition on the cinematographic market, regard being had to the
specific characteristics of that market .... It is for the national court to make
such inquiries as may be necessary .... It is for national courts, where appro-
priate, to make such inquiries and in particular to establish whether or not the
exercise of the exclusive right to exhibit a cinematographic film creates barri-
ers which are artificial and unjustifiable in terms of the needs of the cinemato-
graphic industry, or the possibility of charging fees which exceed a fair return
on investment, or an exclusivity the duration of which is disproportionate to
those requirements, and whether or not, from a general point of view, such
exercise within a given geographic area is such as to prevent, restrict or distort
competition within the common market.
Accordingly, . . . a contract whereby the owner of the copyright in a film
grants an exclusive right to exhibit that film for a specific period in the terri-
tory of a Member State is not, as such, subject to the prohibitions contained in
Article 85 of the Treaty. It is, however, where appropriate, for the national
court to ascertain whether, in a given case, the manner in which the exclusive
right conferred by that contract is exercised is subject to a situation in the
economic or legal sphere the object or effect of which is to prevent or restrict
the distribution of films or to distort competition within the cinematographic
market, regard being had to the specific characteristics of that market.
Coditel II, [1982] E.C.R. at 3402, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 70. See also Danske Videogramdis-
tributorer v. Laserdisken/Pedersen, Case 61/97, (not yet decided) (discussing whether
Articles 30-36 allow right holder who sells videodiscs for renting in one Member State to
prevent their importation for renting in another Member State).
13. Polydor v. Harlequin, Case 270/80, [1982] E.C.R. 329, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 677;
EMI v. CBS, Joined Cases 51/75, 86/75, 96/75, [1976] E.C.R. 811, 871, 913, [1976] 2
C.M.L.R. 235; Council Directive No. 92/100, art. 9, OJ. L 346/61 (1992).
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results that'could not be obtained by agreement.
1 4
There is no exhaustion of copyright if the first sale, even
with the owner's consent, was in a Member State whose legisla-
tion does not protect the owner's rights 5 or which was made
after the copyright protection period there has expired. a6
In Collins v. Imtrat,a7 the Court confirmed that the Commu-
nity law prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nation-
ality applies to copyright laws and is directly applicable in na-
tional courts without needing any implementing national meas-
ures. This means that everyone whose rights are governed by
Community law must be treated, in each Member State, in the
same way as its citizens. Therefore, a Member State cannot make
copyright rights depend on the owner residing in the State,
when this is not required of its own citizens.
In addition, the Commission has acted against contractual
export restrictions in copyright licences in various cases. 8
C. Freedom to Provide Services
The EC Treaty prohibits discriminatory restrictions on free-
14. Consten and Grundig v. Commission, Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, [1966]
E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418 (trademark used to back up illegal exclusive distribu-
tion agreement); EMI v. CBS, Joined Cases 51/75, 86/75, and 96/75, [1976] E.C.R.
811, 871, 913, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 235 (trademark rights exercisable because market
allocation agreement which had led to their assignment had clearly ceased to operate).
If an agreement to use different technical standards in the United States and Europe
was illegal, associated intellectual property rights could not be used to achieve the same
results.
15. Warner Brothers v. Christiansen, Case 158/86, [1988] E.C.R. 2605, [1990] 3
C.M.L.R. 684; EMI Electrola v. Patricia, Case 341/87, [1989] E.C.R. 79, [1989] 2
C.M.L.R. 413.
16. EMI Electrola v. Patricia, Case 341/87, [1989] E.C.R. 79, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R.
413.
17. Collins v. Imtrat, and Patricia v. EMI Electrola, Joined Cases 92/92 and 326/
92, [1993] E.C.R. I 5145, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 773.
• 18. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1977, at 85 (1977) (BBC and "the Old Man and the Sea"); COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1980, at 73-74
(1980) (Ernest Benn and Dutch Publishers' Association); COMMISSION OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES, ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1981, at 66-67 (1981)
(STEMRA); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TWELFTH REPORT ON COMPE-
TITION POLICY 1982, at 73-74(1983) (Neilson-Hordel-Richmark); see generally Commis-
sion's Proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of computer programs,
COM (88) 816 (detailing Commission's views on relationship between Community
Competition Law and Copyright); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EIGHT-
EENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1989, at 56-7 (1990).
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dom to provide services. Instead, the treaty provides for harmo-
nization of national rules on services. This has largely been
based on the principle of mutual recognition. A company pro-
viding a service, however, may have to comply with the national
requirements in the Member State where it. is providing services
in addition to those requirements in its own Member State, if
this is necessary for reasons based on the general good.19 Sub-
ject to this, companies must not be required to set up branch
operations in the host state.
But public interest restrictions can be imposed only insofar
as the public interest is not safeguarded by rules in the State
where the service provider has its base.2" Restrictions in the pub-
lic interest must not "go beyond what is necessary in order to
achieve the intended goals."'"
1. Bond van Adverterrders
In Bond van Adverteerders22 the Court held that the distribu-
tion by cable networks of television programs broadcast in other
Member States, containing advertisements intended especially
for the public in the State where the cable companies operate,
involve services within the meaning of the Treaty. The Court
struck down, as discriminatory, prohibitions on advertisements
directed specifically at the Dutch market. The Court also struck
down prohibitions on subtitles in Dutch in programs directed at
the Dutch market because they applied only to television stations
outside the Netherlands. The ban on subtitling merely comple-
mented the ban on advertising.
19. Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur, Case 33/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R.
298; Ministere Public v. Van Wesemael, Joined Cases 110 arid 111/78, [1979] E.C.R. 35,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 87; Alpine Investments v. Minister van Financien, Case 384/93,
[1995] E.C.R. I 1141, 1178-82, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 209; Gebhard v. Consiglio Dell'
Ordine Degli Avvocati E, Case 55/94, [1996] E.C.R. 189, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (re-
quirements for establishment must be non-discriminatory, imperative in general inter-
est, appropriate to their objectives and proportional).
20. Criminal Proceedings against Alfred Webb, Case 279/80, [1981] E.C.R. 3305,
[1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 719.
21. EC Commission v. France, Case 96/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1475, 1486, [1986] 3
C.M.L.R. 57.
22. Bond Van Adverteerders v. The State, Case 352/85, [1988] E.C.R. 2085, [1989]
3 C.M.L.R. 113.
1998] 1305
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2. Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda & Commission v.
Netherlhnds
In two other leading cases involving television and the
Dutch law on media,23 the Court stated that restrictions on free-
dom to provide services in one Member State, which apply to
companies established in another Member State, are permitted
only if they are justified by overriding reasons relating to the
public interest or if the requirements in the legislation of the
host or receiving State are not satisfied by the rules imposed in
the State where the company is established. Overriding reasons
relating to the public interest include protection of intellectual
property and consumer protection. In addition, the application
of the laws of the host State to providers of services established in
other Member States must guarantee the achievement of the in-
tended aim and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve
that objective. In other words, it must not be possible to obtain
the same result by less restrictive rules.
Having restated these principles, the Court, in the first of
these cases, decided that certain rules about broadcasters,
namely that advertising must be handled by a legal entity sepa-
rate from that responsible for programs, all advertising revenue
must be used to produce programs, and third parties must not
be allowed to make a profit, were not necessary to protect Dutch
culture or pluralism. It also decided that restrictions relating to
television advertisements, namely that they must be clearly rec-
ognizable as such and separate from the other parts of the pro-
gram, they may not exceed five percent of air time, and they
must not be broadcast on Sundays, were not justified, because
their main effect was to protect the profits of the Dutch TV ad-
vertising enterprise. The Court recognized, however, that some
restrictions on TV advertising could be justified to protect con-
sumers against excessive advertising or to maintain program
quality, as an objective of cultural policy.
In Commission v. Netherlands, the Court struck down a rule of
Dutch law requiring companies broadcasting for the Dutch mar-
ket, including those in other Member States, to have all their
radio programs and a fixed proportion of their TV programs
23. Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda v. Commissariaat Voor De
Media, Case 288/89, [1991] E.C.R. 14007; Commission v. Netherlands, Case 353/89,
[1991] E.C.R. 1-4069.
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produced by a State-owned Dutch Company. Pluralism in the
audiovisual sector cannot be affected by allowing broadcasters to
use program-producers in other Member States. Although Arti-
cle 90 does presuppose the existence of some enterprises with
special or exclusive rights, not all special or exclusive rights are
necessarily compatible with the Treaty.
3. Greek TV Case
In the Greek Television case, 24 the Greek TV company had
discriminated in favor of programs that it had itself made. The
Court held that Community law does not prohibit the granting
of a television monopoly for non-economic reasons relating to
the public interest. But such a monopoly must not discriminate
against imported goods or services, unless the discrimination is
specifically justified on one of the grounds set out in the Treaty,
in the light of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Article 90 prohibits a State from granting exclusive
rights to transmit TV broadcasts where those rights are liable to
lead to discrimination in favor of the monopoly's own programs,
unless this is permitted by Article 90(2).
4. Commission v. Belgium
In Commission v. Belgium (VTM),25 the Court stated that
Member States are not free to prohibit cable companies from
carrying on their networks programs from broadcasters in other
Member States on the grounds that the programs are not in a
language of the receiving State. Such a rule is discriminatory,
and unjustifiable. A State cannot prohibit services by companies
in other States altogether, although it can take action if broad-
casters aiming principally at its territory set up abroad to avoid
rules that would apply if they were set up on its territory, such as
rules intended to establish a pluralist and non-commercial radio
and TV system.26
24. Radiofonia, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-2925, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 540.
25. Commission v. Belgium, Case 211/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6757; See COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1991, at 459
(1993) (BBC Enterprises).
26. TV10 SA v. Commissariat Voor de Media, Case 23/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4795,
[1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 284.
1998] 1307
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5. Leclerc-Siplec
In Leclerc-Siplec,27 the Court held that Article 30 allows a
Member State to prohibit broadcasting of televised advertise-
ments for distributors of goods. Distributors could advertise in
other ways, and the rules applied to all traders in the state and
affected imported and domestic goods in the same way. Nor
does Directive 89/552 prevent this, since it allows Member States
to impose rules stricter than those required by the Directive for
TV advertising.
D. Directives Relating to Television Services
The EC Commission has adopted several Directives that re-
late to and influence multimedia and television rights through-
out the EU.
1. Directive on Competition in the Markets for
Telecommunications Services
Since the coming into force of a Directive adopted in
1990,28 cable TV networks could be used for providing liberal-
ized telecommunications services..
2. Directive Concerning the Pursuit of Television
Broadcasting Activities
A Directive adopted in 1989,29 commonly called the televi-
27. Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicit6 and MG Publicity, Case 412/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-
179, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 422.
28. Commission Directive 90/388, O.J. L 192/10 (1990) (amended by Commis-
sion Directive 96/51, O.J. L 256/49 (1995)).
29. Council Directive 89/552, O.J. L 298/23 (1989). The European Court of Jus-
tice summarized this directive as follows:
The main purpose of the Directive, which was adopted on the basis of
Articles 57(2) and 66 of the Treaty, is to ensure freedom to provide television
broadcasting services.
To that end, it lays down, according to the thirteenth and fourteenth re-
citals in the preamble, minimum rules to govern broadcasts emanating from
and intended for reception within the Community and in particular those in-
tended for reception in another Member State.
To attain that objective, Chapter II of the Directive, devoted to general
provisions, requires Member States from which broadcasts are made to ensure
that television broadcasters under theirjurisdiction comply with the provisions
of the Directive (Article 3(2)) and Member States receiving broadcasts to en-
sure freedom of reception and not to restrict retransmission on their territory
of television broadcasts from other Member States for reasons which fall
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sion without frontiers directive, EC Member States were re-
quired to ensure free reception of TV broadcasts from other
Member States, and prohibited from restricting retransmission.
Advertising on TV must be readily recognizable as advertising
and kept separate from other parts of the program service. Ad-
vertising normally may not exceed fifteen percent of daily trans-
mission time and there are rules about the content of advertise-
ments. Also, where practicable, a majority of transmission time
should be reserved for European programs.
3. Directive on the Adoption of Standards for Satellite
Broadcasting of Television Signals
By another directive, adopted in 1992,3" the Council re-
quired Member States to promote advanced satellite broadcast-
ing for television, using certain technical standards, and giving a
standard-setting role to the European Telecommunications Stan-
dards Institute ("E.T.S.I.").
4. Directives on the Use of Standards for the Transmission of
Television Signals.
By another directive in 1995, 11 Member States were obliged
to use certain technical standards for television transmission by
cable, satellite, or terrestrial means. Article 4 of this directive
contains a provision relating to conditional access television.
within the fields coordinated by the Directive, although they may provisionally
suspend broadcasts in certain specified cases (Article 2(2)). Article
3(1),which is in the same chapter, provides that Member States are to remain
free, as regards television broadcasters under their jurisdiction, to lay down
more detailed or stricter rules in the areas covered by the, Directive.
The fields coordinated by the Directive include the minimum provisions
governing the Member States from which broadcasts are made relating to tele-
vised advertising, which are contained in Chapter IV.
See Mattel/Lego, 1995/95 Rep. EFTA Ct. 113 (interpreting Directive).
This Directive is currently being amended by the European Parliament and the
Council. It does not apply to new on-line audiovisual services such as video-on-demand,
but will apply to teleshopping. Leclerc-Siplec v. TFI Publicite and M6 Publicite, Case
412/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-179, 219, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 422.
30. Council Directive No. 92/38, O.J. L 137/17 (1992) (concerning adoption of
standards for satellite broadcasting of television signals).
31. Council Directive No. 95/47, OJ. L 281/51 (1995) (concerning use of "ad-
vanced television standards" for transmission of television signals); See also Council Di-
rective 92/38, O.J. L 137/17 (1992) (concerning standards for satellite broadcasting of
Television signals). The Commission's 1997 proposal on legal protection of services
based on conditional access is not relevant to the issue discussed in the text.
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The provision states that Member States shall take all the neces-
sary measures to ensure that the operators of conditional access
services, irrespective of the means of transmission, who produce
and market access services to digital television services, offer to
all broadcasters, on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory ba-
sis, technical -services enabling the broadcasters' digitally-trans-
mitted services to be received by viewers authorized by means of
decoders administered by the service operators, and comply with
Community competition law, in particular if a dominant posi-
tion appears. This provision deals partly with the problems of
decoders and set top boxes, because:
" it only applies to the new digital services, not to the existing
analogue services, which will continue for some years and
which confer market power at present;
" it benefits only broadcasters, and cable companies are not
regarded as broadcasters, for they usually merely carry pro-
grams originated by other companies;
" it does not guarantee access for the provision of interactive
services, which are not television but which may have an
important impact on the profitability of cable companies
and other carriers of television services in the near future;
" a fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory basis is not a very
precise duty; and
* the directive only applies to conditional access systems, and
not to other essential facilities of similar kinds or having
similar effects, in particular the application program inter-
face, the verifier system and the electronic program guide.
5. Cases Interpreting the Directives
In a recent case involving Council Directive 89/552,2 the
Court held that a Member State may not determine which satel-
lite broadcasters come under its jurisdiction by using criteria
other than establishment, such as transmission or reception of
programs. Such Criteria lead to the receiving State exercising
control, contrary to the directive, over broadcasts coming from,
and, therefore, under the jurisdiction of, another State. The
Court said that the Council of Europe Convention on Trans-
32. See Commission v. UK, Case 222/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-4025, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R.
793; Denuit, Case C-14/96, [1997] E.C.R. _, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 943; De Agostini,
Joined Cases 34/95, 35/95 and 36/95, All ER (EC) 687 (1997).
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frontier Television does not help to interpret the directive, be-
cause it uses a different approach.
In another case, 33 the Court held that the directive applies
to distribution of television by cable. It -is solely for the State
from which TV broadcasts come to monitor the application of
the law of the originating State. In general it is not for the re-
ceiving state to monitor this.
In a recent judgment,34 the Court held that a broadcaster is
subject to the jurisdiction of the where it is established and, if it
established in two Member States, that of the State where it has
the center of its activities, in particular where its program is de-
cided and where its programs are finally put together.
E. Directives Relating to Copyright
A 1992 Directive35 harmonized principles of copyright law
for authors, performers, phonogram producers, and the produ-
cers of firms. Under the directive, authors and performers are
given a non-waiveable right to equitable remuneration. The ad-
ministration of this right may be given to collecting societies rep-
resenting authors or performers. Performers, producers of films
and phonograms, and broadcasting organizations are given ex-
clusive rights. Cable distributors get no copyright as a result of
mere retransmission. A single payment must be made if a pho-
nogram published for commercial purposes is used for broad-
casting, and must be shared between the performers and the
producer of the sound recording.
The right to sell copies of goods in which there is copyright
is called the distribution right. This is the exclusive right of per-
formers, producers of films and sound recordings, and broad-
casting organizations. This right is exhausted within the Com-
munity only if the first sale in the Community is made by the
33. Commission v. Belgium, Case 11/95, [1996] E.C.R. I 4115, [1997] 2 C.M.L.R.
289.
34. VT4 Ltd v. Vlaamse Gemeenschap, Case C-56/96, [1997] E.C.R., [1997] 3
C.M.L.R. 1225.
35. Council Directive 92/100, O.J. L 346/61 (1992). See also Council Directive 93/
98, O.J. L 290/9 (1993) (harmonizing term of protection of copyright); Council Direc-
tive 93/83, O.J. L 248/15 (1993) (explaining coordination of rules concerning copy-
right.. . applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission); See generally The
Commission's Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Soci-
ety, COM (95) 382 Final (1995), and Follow up to the Green Paper on Copyright, COM
(96) 568 (1996).
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right holder or with its consent. Compulsory licences are al-
lowed only to the extent permitted by the International Conven-
tion for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations, the Rome Convention, and in
accordance with the national copyright law on literary and artis-
tic works. A twenty-year copyright period was fixed for films.
The other periods must be at least those in the Berne Conven-
tion for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works for au-
thors' right and in the Rome Convention for performers, produ-
cers of sound recordings and broadcasting organizations.
Then in 1993, the Commission adopted a directive dealing
specifically with copyright and rights related to copyright appli-
cable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission. 36 Essen-
tially, this directive extends the earlier directive to communica-
tion of copyright material by satellite and by cable. When pro-
grams from other Member States are retransmitted by cable in
one State, copyright rights must be respected in that State. The
right of copyright owners to grant or refuse a licence for cable
retransmission may be exercised only through a collecting soci-
ety, except in the case of a broadcasting company's own trans-
mission. Mediators are to be appointed to help with negotia-
tions. Member States are to ensure that parties do not prevent
negotiation without justification.
II. RELEVANT EU MARKETS RELATING TO MULTIMEDIA
A. Relevant Geographic Markets
Relevant geographic markets in the media sectors in Eu-
rope are still, to a surprising extent, national. This is primarily
for linguistic reasons. Except in the case of a radio channel spe-
cifically aimed abroad, such as the BBC World Service, most pub-
lic broadcasting companies have no reason to broadcast pro-
grams in languages other than their own national languages. In
states such as Belgium with two major national languages, sepa-
rate channels broadcast in each language. Channels that are fi-
nanced largely or wholly by advertisements may have difficulty
getting advertising revenue unless their programs are directed at
listeners of one linguistic group in one Member State. Many
programs and films produced in one language are given subti-
36. Council Directive No. 93/83, O.J. L 248/15 (1993).
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ties or soundtracks in another language when they are shown to
audiences in another State. Where there are large enough num-
bers of foreigners living in a State, their interests may be met by
specialized radio or TV channels, or by imported films, newspa-
pers or magazines. Advertisers also find significant differences
in the tastes and preferences of buyers in different States, some
of them no doubt due merely to tradition and habit, and they try
to adapt their advertisements as far as possible to buyers' tastes
in these respects. TV viewers who want to watch sports programs
are significantly more interested in seeing teams and players of
their own nationality than those from other countries. Viewers
who have invested substantial sums of money in a decoder, set-
top box, will tend to continue to watch programs transmitted to
their fellow-countrymen and women with the same kind of de-
coders. 7 Cable TV companies will not pay for the right to trans-
mit a program in a State unless they are sure they have a large
enough audience for it there. There is also some evidence that a
TV channel that set out to have a Europe-wide audience loses
market share to otherwise similar channels that broadcast in
only one language and try to appeal primarily to popular tastes
in one country. The language used for the commentary on a
sports event largely determines the audience that will watch the
program. In short, entrenched language-based consumer pref-
erences make markets national, and cause most programs to be
produced in the Member State in question.
The primarily national or linguistic nature of geographical
media markets in Europe is not altered by the fact that some of
the companies involved are international or multinational. To a
large extent they adapt their programs to national audiences,
and when they move into new States they tend to do so with local
partners, whether carriers or content providers. The fact that a
competitor is multinational does not mean that the relevant
market is multinational, although it may, of course, give the
company concerned economies of scale or other advantages
when bidding, for example, for the rights to televise the Olympic
37. See Tetra Pak Int'l SA v. Commission, Case 333/94, [1997] All ER (EC) 4
[hereinafter Tetra Pak II]. On the significance of the cost to users of changing equip-
ment on linguistic markets, see generally Commission Decision No. 94/922/EC, O.J. L
364/1 (1994), [1995] 1 C.E.C. 2509 [hereinafter MSG Media Service]; RTL-Veronica-
Endemol, O.J. L 134/32 (1995); Kirch-Richemont-Multichoice-Telepin, Merger deci-
sion No. M 584, 17 (May 5, 1995).
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Games or experience in subscriber management systems. Many
people fail to understand this. Many radio stations, of course,
have local or regional markets.
B. Relevant Service Markets
There are a large and increasing number of distinct service
and product markets in the media sectors in Europe.3 s Cinema
films are produced and distributed through cinemas and video
rental and sales shops. Sound recordings are produced and
sold, and are played in places that are open to the public, giving
rise to the collection of royalties. The production of cinema
films and sound recordings involves different kinds of compa-
nies and artists. Cinemas provide services both to audiences and
to the film studios whose films they distribute. TV stations pro-
vide services to views, to advertisers and to program right owners.
Cable companies provide services both to viewers and to broad-
casting companies whose programs they receive and distribute to
householders.
Because various relationships involve the parties in provid-
ing services to one another and not merely one party paying for
services provided by the other, even a bilateral relationship may
involve assessing market power on two markets, not just one.
This is complex, but not inherently difficult.
1. Emerging Content Markets and Resulting Problems
Greater difficulty has arisen in defining product markets by
program content because of the rapid increase in the number of
specialized TV channels, due to cables and digitalization. Chan-
nels and, therefore, demand for content are emerging for the
following areas:
* children's programs;
* news;
• feature films;
* archives;
* shopping;
* documentary;
38. For some recent statements on the definition of relevant markets, see gener-
ally, TetraPak 1, [1997] All ER (EC) 4; MSG Media Service, OJ. L 364/1 (1994), [1995]
1 C.E.C. 2509.
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" ethnic;
" science fiction;
* cartoons;
* pop music;
" gardening;
" do-it-yourself-activities; and
" particular kinds of sports.
This creates a series of narrower markets than previously ex-
isted, in particular for the content providers and the organizers
of sports events who ultimately generate the content for sports
channels.
One difficulty this has caused is on how to decide whether,
for example, any other sports are substitutable for Formula I mo-
tor racing or soccer. Such questions must be answered first in
the light of viewers' demands, as this will influence or determine
the attitudes of advertisers and broadcasters. Increasingly, con-
tracts between broadcasters and organizers of sports events, in-
volving large sums of money, mean that important events are
broadcast live, and viewers expect that they will be. It seems that
in most countries professional soccer broadcast live is a sport for
which no other sport is satisfactorily substitutable, and Formula I
motor racing also may be. Some other sports are in the same
category, no alternative being satisfactory to viewers, but only in
some Member States. A distinction must also be drawn in all
countries between international events in which national teams
are participating, and lesser events, and between the final games
in a competition and the games in the first round. There is also
a difference between live coverage and recorded coverage, and
between full coverage and extracts, and there is a separate mar-
ket for full live coverage of important sports events.
The degree of substitutability of various events can be mea-
sured in various ways, bearing in mind that developments in the
industry, in particular viewers' rising expectations, are making
them less substitutable over time. Audience ratings, what adver-
tisers are willing to pay for slots during particular events, what
broadcasters are willing to pay for the right to broadcast each
event, and what viewers pay if events are broadcast pay-per-view,
are all useful measures.
Because markets are primarily national, the key question is
1998] 1315
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the degree of substitutability in each national market, not in
other Member States. A given sports event, team, or player will
interest a much larger audience in one state than in another,
perhaps even in one region within the same state.
2. EBU-Eurovision System
In the EBU decision,39 the Commission was able to treat all
sports television as if it formed a single content market. How-
ever, that was primarily because the parties to the joint buying
arrangements did not differentiate between different sports.
The Commission, therefore, saw no reason to do so for the pur-
poses of that case. The positions of the parties .as buyers were
similar in relation to all the main televised sports. The criticism
of the decision came from other broadcasters, not from sports
organizations. The EBU decision certainly does not mean that
the Commission would now regard all sports as substitutable for
one another. The Commission does not do this, nor would any
other European antitrust authority.
3. Supplier Market
Apart from content markets, distinctions need to be made
between different kinds of services. Similar services can be sup-
plied to different kinds of buyers. One distinction which needs
to be drawn is between the supply of television services at whole-
sale level, by satellite and other broadcasting companies to cable
TV companies, and at retail level, to viewers and households.
Television can be provided direct-to-home by satellite or terres-
trial means, or through cables, so cable companies are in compe-
tition with satellite and terrestrial TV companies in the supply of
TV to households. TV can be supplied to households as pay TV,
where the householder pays a fixed sum per month for the right
to see certain TV channels, or pay-per-view, where the house-
holder pays special rates for particular programs. Ultimately
pay-per-view should be even more profitable than pay TV be-
cause it is the most discriminating price policy a monopolist can
have.
39. Commission Decision No. 93/403/EEC, O.J. L 179/23 (1993) [hereinafter
EBU Eurovision], annulled in Metropole Television v. Commission, Case T-528/93,
[1996] E.C.R. 1I 649, [1996] 5 C.M.L.R. 386 (CFI), on grounds not related to the defini-
tion of the market (on appeal to ECJ).
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Separate questions concern the degree of substitutability for
viewers between pay-TV, pay-per-view, video-on-demand, and
near-video-on-demand, on the one hand, and specialized TV
channels on the other. The degree of substitutability depends
among other things on the desired content being available at the
right moment, rather than on the media in question themselves.
A viewer who wants to see Gone with the Wind may be able to see it
in various ways. A viewer who wants to see the latest football
final, which is of less lasting interest, however, may not. Both for
a media corporation with a range of services and for a viewer
with special interests, there may be a high degree of sub-
stitutability for any content with lasting or clearly defined ap-
peal, whether it is educational, informative, or entertainment.
More broadly, on-line newspapers compete with traditional
newspapers.
As far as productions for television are concerned, although
there are substantial in-house productions, only productions
commissioned by a broadcaster or sometimes programs pro-
duced on the producer's initiative are on the market.4 ° The
market for TV productions is often broader than the national
market, and is a language region, for example Germany plus
Austria or the United Kingdom, plus Ireland.
There is some competition between video rental or
purchase of feature films and watching them on television or on
video on demand and between watching sports live on television
and watching them live in the stadium. This limited kind of
competition is relevant when the companies that control both
kinds of rights try to prevent competition between them from
reducing their aggregate financial value. Also, a thematic fea-
ture film channel can be exposed to some competition when a
popular film is broadcast on a general-purpose channel, when it
is shown in cinemas, and when it is available on video. This kind
of competition may become more important when pay-per-view
TV develops further. Business practice provides windows during
which films are made available for different purposes.
The Commission has concluded4 1 that advertising on televi-
sion and advertising in print are separate markets. Audience
40. RTL-Veronica-Endemol, O.J. L 134/32 24-25, 88-89 (1995).
41. Id., O.J. L 134/32, at 23.
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shares in TV broadcasting determine the success of broadcasters
in the TV advertising market.
Though the distinction between free access and pay-TV may
become blurred in the future as digital bundles combining both
kinds emerge, at present pay-TV is a separate market from free
access TV, although free access TV exerts some competitive pres-
sure on pay-TV.
The Commission analyzed the relevant television service
markets in detail in MSG Media Service.42 The Commission found
that the relevant product markets were:
* administrative and technical services for suppliers of pay-
TV, primarily decoders, a conditional access system, and
subscriber management systems;
e cable TV networks, which the Commission regarded as dis-
tinct from television services provided direct-to-home by
satellite or terrestrial transmission; and
* pay-TV, which the Commission considered as a market sep-
arate from commercially financed TV and TV financed
wholly or partly through fees and sometimes partly by ad-
vertising, because in commercially financed TV the con-
tractual relationship is between program supplier and ad-
vertiser, in pay-TV the relationship is between program sup-
plier and viewer.
It may also be appropriate to distinguish between the mar-
ket for background music in commercial premises, which has
constant volume, little or no speech, unobtrusive music, and the
market for radio services for domestic customers, which can in-
clude advertisements and other speech. The former competes
with advertising-free radio, both public and commercial, and
with tapes and compact discs, and on occasion with in-house mu-
sic. Domestic listeners also have access to digital pay-radio, com-
mercial and public radio, and their own sound recordings.
The activities of performing rights societies and other socie-
ties that collect royalties on behalf of copyright owners involve
different service markets. Although in theory the societies are
collecting agents of the right holders, in practice they have be-
come so large and, it must be said, so dictatorial that they tend
to organize their affairs much as they have traditionally organ-
42. MSG Media Service, Oj. L 364/1, at 11 19-44 (1994), [1995] 1 C.E.C. 2509.
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ized them. The right holders provide a service by licensing their
rights, through the network of societies, to those who want to
play or record their works. The societies provide their collecting
services to the right holders and their licensing services to sound
reproduction companies. Traditionally each society has oper-
ated only in one state, and exchanged licenses with societies in
other states on behalf of its members. A series of markets are
therefore involved.
Yet another issue is whether pay-per-view TV is a separate
market from pay-TV, in spite of the fact that* the parties to the
contracts involved are the same. It seems that the nature of the
programs provided, the fact that the viewer may choose to pay or
not to see each program specifically, and in particular the huge
price difference, means that they are separate markets. The
price of one program on pay-per-view may be a quarter of the
pay-TV subscription for a month.
C. BSkyB-UK Markets & Barriers to Entry
In the second UK Office of Fair Trading review of BSkyB's
position, the relevant market was for wholesale pay TV, divided
into separate markets for premium sports and movie channels.
In these markets a potential competitor, to enter the market,
needed quality programming rights, transponder space on a sat-
ellite able to reach the installed disk or aerial base, encryption
technology compatible with that base, and a subscriber manage-
ment system. These were regarded as barriers to entry. A broad-
caster could enter the market with a basic channel on a cable-
exclusive basis, but the investment needed to acquire all the
rights needed for a viable premium channel was so large that
access to the installed aerial base of UK subscribers to pay-TV
was essential. The limited supply of suitable analogue transpon-
ders was, therefore, a serious entry barrier.
D. Exclusivity & Privileges to Launch New Services
The argument is frequently made that exclusive rights to
broadcast sports events and feature- films are needed in order to
obtain finance for the big investment needed for launching digi-
tal television, or conditional access systems, or other major in-
vestments. This argument cannot be assessed in the abstract:
everything depends on the circumstances in the Member State
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in question at the relevant time, that is, when the exclusive
agreements are signed.
The argument raises several distinct questions. The first is
whether it could be said that Article 85(1) does not apply at all
because without the exclusive rights, the investment would not
be made. The second question is whether the conditions of Arti-
cle 85 (3) are fulfilled by the exclusivity clause, and if so, for what
period an exemption should be given.
In an extreme case, no rational investor would invest with-
out substantial exclusive rights.43 But an advantage which every
negotiator would obtain if possible is not the same as a prerequi-
site without which no investment would ever occur. Some exclu-
sive rights to attractive content, for at least an initial period, can
be necessary. Even in such cases Article 85(1) would apply to
whatever exclusive rights were in addition to the basic minimum,
and also apply to the initially obtained rights after the initial
launch period, whatever that was exactly. The practical conclu-
sion is that in most circumstances it would be unwise to rely on
Article 85(1) being inapplicable, even if in theory it may be so,
even before cumulative effects of a series of exclusive agree-
ments are taken into account. In any case, it is important to re-
member that the question is an objective one, would a rational
investor do this, and it is not answered by the companies saying,
however sincerely, that they would not have done it.
In theory the question whether an exemption under Article
85(3) should be given ought to be answered on the basis of the
facts at the time when the agreement is made. Although this is
not always strictly adhered to, it does mean that it would not be
appropriate for the Commission to wait and see how the market
developed and grant or refuse an individual exemption retroac-
tively in the light of later developments. This means that the
Commission may have to act on an opinion about future devel-
opments in the market.
It also follows that a state measure under Article 90(2),
granting a privileged position to a company to facilitate its
launch, might be justified for an initial period and might be no
longer justified after whatever period was long enough to allow a
reasonably efficient enterprise to launch its activities. Again, the
43. See Nungesser v. Commission, Case 258/78, [1982] E.C.R 2015, [1983] 1
C.M.L.R. 278; Coditel I, [1982] E.C.R. at 11-3401-02, 1 15-20, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 49.
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test must be an objective one for Article 90(2) does not allow
Member States to protect inefficient enterprises from competi-
tion. The test should be applied at the time when the measure is
adopted regardless of the fact that the enterprise has taken a
longer or shorter time to become competitive without help is
irrelevant.
III. DOMINANCE WITHIN THE MULTIMEDIA INDUSTRY
A. Advantages Contributing to Media Industry Dominance
Apart from market shares in whatever markets are relevant,
market power can be shown in Community law by a variety of
different kinds of evidence. It may be convenient to distinguish
between dominant content or program providers and dominant
carriers or broadcasters of programs, yet some enterprises are
both. Some telecommunications companies may be, or may
soon become, carriers in the sense of providers of conditional
access systems.
Content providers' dominance may be based on the owner-
ship or acquisition of exclusive rights over large quantities of
commercially valuable content, in particular repertoires of fea-
ture films for broadcasting on television, and rights to televise
important sports events live. It may also be based on large-scale
and well known news services.
These provide the content for the pay-TV channels which
attract the greatest numbers of viewers and get the largest num-
bers of householders to sign up.
In general barriers to entry are easier to set up, and likely
to be more serious, in new, already concentrated markets, in
which new entrants are needed for competitiveness, than in
long-established markets.
Apart from market share, in broadcasting the following
advantages are relevant when assessing the market power of
carriers and content providers.44
" Control over commercially attractive content, and a large
portfolio of programs, in particular sport and films.
" Control over set-top-boxes, which unscramble encoded
44. See MSG Media Service, O.J. L 364/1, at 11 55-93, [1995] 1 C.E.C. 2509 (analyz-
ing effects of proposed joint venture between television companies and telecommunica-
tions company).
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broadcasts intended to be viewed only by subscribers who
have signed contracts with a satellite company, and other
aspects of conditional access technology.
" Control over a high proportion of the channels which can
be broadcast using available satellites, and options or other
contractual rights over additional channels or satellites.
* First mover advantages discussed more fully below.
* Control over an electronic program guide.
" Financial resources, to pay for long-term contracts for valu-
able content or to pay for the production of set-top-boxes
to be sold to or rented to householders, in the case of some
public service broadcasters, revenue from licence fees paid
by owners of TV sets also contributes to financial strength.
* Experience in subscriber management. A subscriber man-
agement system must deal with all individual requests for
particular services and give different instructions to each
individual set top box.
" Technical experience with developing other services, such
as telecommunications, Internet, interactive services, that
can be combined with television, preferential access to pro-
gram software, or substantial long term contractual links
with companies developing those services, horizontal inte-
gration or links.
" Satellite transponder capacity, radio frequency spectrum,
cable bandwidth or other significant delivery capacity.
* Share holdings in satellite companies and cable networks,
and also in companies providing telecommunications and
interactive services.
* A large base of subscribers already signed up, which in-
creases advertising revenue, as well as strengthening the
company's finances directly, and provides useful customer
information.
" A number of channels already being broadcast, making an
attractive package.
* The ability to produce its own programs, ownership of the
merchandising rights, for example, the right to sell videos
of a portfolio of valuable programs.
45. The question of how far dominant telecommunications companies should be
free to control cable networks is an important issue both due to convergence and in the
telecommunications market itself.
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" Vertical integration, creating power to shut competitors out
of the market at more than one level, and forcing them to
enter the market at more than one level simultaneously.
" Control of a book club or any other network which is an
important potential distribution channel for pay-TV.
* A program portfolio big enough to make it easy to produce
a wide variety of different specialized packages of programs
targeted at particular groups.
* The ability, though control of technical services needed by
competitors, in particular the subscriber management sys-
tem, to obtain information about the plans and activities of
the competitors, and the preferences of subscribers.
" Control over resources, including rights of way for cables,
and spectrum resources.
" A pay-TV company which has subscribers in several States
finds it easier to negotiate film rights than a company with
the same number of subscribers in only one country.
" Where the capacity of cables of analog signals is limited and
is fully used, it is very difficult for a second pay-TV company
to get access to them, since the cable company will neither
want to replace one package of channels with another nor
be free to replace one channel at a time to test customer
reaction to the second company's channels.
These factors, which contribute to dominance, tend to reinforce
one another, thereby producing cumulative effects. If, as a re-
sult of a vertical or convergent merger, a series of new barriers to
entry arise, a series of measures may need to be taken to correct
the situation.
B. The Tipping Effect
Some media sectors show what is called the tipping effect,
which is important in considering dominance. This effect oc-
curs when one company obtains a market share that is substan-
tially greater than its competitors, and when this in itself causes
it to attract more customers. This can be due to a newspaper
having a wide circulation or a television station having a large
audience. Advertisers assume that they will reach a larger audi-
ence, which is correct, and that they will get better value for
their advertising expenditure, which is not necessarily true. So
they tend to move to the leading company, or it can be due to
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consumers' beliefs that two mutually incompatible TV standards
will not both survive, and their wish to avoid the risk of buying
equipment which might become useless, leading them to con-
tract with the market leader. Tipping effects also occur in net-
works that become more attractive the more members they have.
When a market has tipped in favor of the biggest competitor,
that competitor is likely to become dominant and to remain so
for a considerable time.
A dominant company's dependence on advertising revenue,
however, can inhibit change. In general, a dominant company
that wishes to change from analogue to digital transmission can
increase the number of its digital customers only by reducing the
number of its analogue customers. In addition, advertisers who
are unsure whether the new digital customers are as numerous
as the old analogue customers might cease to advertise in order
to await the outcome, or switch to another station with all-digital
customers.
What may be called a tipping effect can occur simply be-
cause a pay television station, which attracts more subscribers,
can afford to pay more and buy more and better programs. Pro-
gram providers prefer to use the encrypted pay TV package with
the biggest audience and the most popular overall package.
Tipping effects are not the same as first mover advantages in
that, although the effect is similar, the market does not necessar-
ily tip in favor of the first entrant into the market, but in favor of
the first company to get such a decisive lead over its competitors
that the network effect begins.
One of the difficult questions to answer today is how far sim-
ply being the first company in the market with a large number of
set-top-boxes is likely to create a tipping effect. The answer may
be different in different countries.
If the tipping effect occurred as a result of behavior con-
trary to Articles 85-86, the Commission would need to take
strong action to restore a competitive market. The question
whether tipping is likely to occur in the future is important when
deciding whether to authorize the acquisition of exclusive broad-
casting rights for a limited period on the grounds that they are
needed to ensure the financial viability of substantial invest-
ments in new digitalization or conditional access systems. The
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ANTITRUST LAW
risk of tipping is an argument for authorizing exclusive agree-
ments only for relatively short periods.
C. Convergence
Frequently it is stated that due to digitalization the televi-
sion and telecommunications markets, and computing and tele-
communications, are horizontally converging. In this sense,
convergence means several things. First, facilities initially in-
tended for transmission of one kind of content can also be used
for transmitting other kinds. Second, companies so far involved
in either television, whether broadcasting or cable, or telecom-
munications are beginning to involve themselves in the other
sector.
Convergence is occurring for two reasons. First, the need
for telecommunications companies to generate profits for invest-
ment in network is driving them into application areas. Second,
content providers are going into infrastructure so that they can
control distribution and have direct contacts with customers.
This kind of convergence has certainly not yet unified the
television and telecommunications markets.4 6 No new market
definitions are needed yet, however, convergence may make the
advantages of a company dominant in one of these markets rele-
vant to the assessment of its plans in the other. In brief, the two
kinds of markets are now related enough. for market power in
46. There are other examples of convergence of the portable-computer industry,
the Internet, interactive multimedia services, telecommunications equipment compa-
nies, network operators, and software companies, and, within telecommunications, con-
vergence of, for example, cable and satellite. But these seem so far to be less relevant to
media markets, where the most important convergence is between the different kinds
of carriage of entertainment, going in the direction of interactive video delivery. It may
be useful to distinguish technical convergence (e.g. use of cable TV networks for tele-
communications) and convergence in relation to content, which is less likely to hap-
pen, and which is relevant to the question of how much (e.g. audiovisual content made
available through telephone lines) should be subject to media regulation. Many na-
tional regulatory regimes and authorities are still technology-specific, and may need to
be reorganized to cope with converged sectors, and to make it easier for companies
trying to offer both content or services and carriage to deal with a small number of
regulators. The risk of regulatory capture must be kept in mind. From an antitrust
viewpoint, convergence cases tend to raise several kinds of problems: conglomerate
joint ventures and mergers (discussed below), rapidly-changing markets, standards, and
standardization (which may be needed to give the full benefit of convergence), and in
due course, redefinition of relevant markets. Convergence may be accompanied by
specialization, and the whole process does not necessarily lead to broader market defi-
nition.
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one to be used to gain market power in the other, or in interme-
diate or related markets. 47
A variety of different situations can occur. For example, a
company controlling television cables or broadcasting television
programs supplied to households via cable that offers interactive
services may be a duopolist in the market for these services, be-
cause only it and the national telecommunications company are
in a position to offer them on a nation-wide basis. A correspond-
ing situation will arise when a dominant telecommunications
company puts itself in a position to offer feature films and other
visual information by telephone wires, as well as normal telecom
and other interactive services.
In each of these situations a company that is likely to be
dominant is extending its activities into a related market. If it
does so without making any merger or restrictive agreement or
committing any exclusionary abuse, it may of course be perfectly'
47. See, e.g., CBEM Benelux SA v. Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion
SA, Case 311/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3261, 3278, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 558, 573. In this case the
Court said that its ruling in Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Commercial Sol-
vents v. Commission, Joined Cases 6/73 and [1974] E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309,
also applies to the case of an undertaking holding a dominant position on the
market in a service which is indispensable for the activities of another under-
taking on another market. If ... telemarketing activities constitute a separate
market from that of the chosen advertising medium, although closely associ-
ated with it, and if those activities mainly consist in making available to adver-
tisers the telephone lines and team of telephonists of the telemarketing under-
taking, to subject the sale of broadcasting time to the condition that the tele-
phone lines of an advertising agent belonging to the same group as the
television station should be used amounts in practice to a refusal to supply the
services of that station to any other telemarketing undertaking. If, further,
that refusal is not justified by technical or commercial requirements relating
to the nature of the television, but is intended to reserve to the agent any
telemarketing operation broadcast by the said station, with the possibility of
eliminating all competition from another undertaking, such conduct amounts
to an abuse prohibited by Article 86, provided that the other conditions of
that article are satisfied.
It must therefore be held.., that an abuse within the meaning of Article
86 is committed where, without any objective necessity, an undertaking hold-
ing a dominant position on a particular market reserves to itself or to an un-
dertaking belonging to the same group an ancillary activity which might be
carried out by another undertaking as part of its activities on a neighboring
but separate market, with the possibility of eliminating all competition from
such undertaking.
Id., [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. at 573. See John Temple Lang, Defining Legitimate Competition:
Companies'Duties to Supply Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L
LJ. 437 (1994).
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entitled to do so subject to national regulatory rules, but such an
extension of the company's activities into a related area is likely
to raise barriers to entry for third parties because it may mean
that later market entrants need to enter both markets at once. If
it is done jointly with a partner company with a strong market
position, it is also likely to have substantial anti-competitive ef-
fects by eliminating competition between them and giving each
an interest in cooperating only or primarily with the other. In
such circumstances there are also possibilities tying in or bun-
dling with exclusionary effects.
Another less sophisticated situation arises when a company
has interests in both television and newspapers, and the question
arises whether its interests in one are relevant to its market
power over the other. Cross-media interests of these kinds do
not merely provide conglomerate strength. They can provide
valuable reciprocal publicity and enable the company to offer
attractive advertising packages, therefore, raising barriers to en-
try into both markets.
In addition to considering convergence joint ventures
under Article 85 and possible strengthening of a single domi-
nant position, it may also be necessary to consider them as cases
of joint dominance. Two parent companies, each dominant in
their own industries, might well be jointly dominant in a market
which was so closely related to both industries that each parent
separately had important advantages in launching itself, or its
joint venture, in the related market. In most cases, however, this
analysis would not add much to the other two analyses under
Article 85 and Article 86 on single dominant companies.
D. Extending Dominance Through Actions of Public Authorities:
The Case of BskyB
In 1996, the U.K. authorities decided to issue new licences
for digital terrestrial television, in addition to the digital satellite
and digital cable TV already authorized. The strongest applicant
for licences was a joint venture between BSkyB, the dominant
U.K. satellite pay-TV company, and two terrestrial TV compa-
nies. The Independent Television Commission, the authority re-
sponsible for issuing the new licences, realized that issuing the
licences to the joint venture would be likely to cause problems
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under Community antitrust law, and asked the advice of the Eu-
ropean Commission.
The Commission stated that if granting the licence to the
joint venture would extend and strengthen the dominant posi-
tion of BSkyB, as seemed likely, it would be contrary to the prin-
ciple in Ahmed Saeed.4" The ITC informed the joint venture that
no licence could be issued to it unless BSkyB ceased to be a
shareholder in the joint venture, and BSkyB withdrew, selling its
shares to the other shareholders. This resolved most of the anti-
trust difficulties.
Article 90(2), which allows Member States limited powers to
grant some limited exemptions from EC legal rules,49 did not
apply. This is one of the relatively few cases in which, when a
national non-competition authority has formally sought the ad-
vice of the Commission under Community antitrust law, the
Commission's advice has determined the outcome. Although
the same result might have been arrived at under national com-
petition law, the ITC letter to BSkyB was expressly based on the
Commission's advice.
The case was a clear one. The granting of the licences to a
joint venture in which BSkyB held a one-third interest would cer-
tainly have strengthened its dominant position in pay-TV trans-
mitted by satellite and by cable. There would be little point in
trying to promote competition by granting licences for digital
terrestrial TV to a subsidiary of a company already dominant in
satellite and cable. But the principle that a national regulatory
authority may not grant a licence to a dominant company if the
grant would extend or strengthen an existing dominant position
is an important one, with obvious relevance in the telecommuni-
cation sector. If the dominant enterprise could itself have
achieved the same results by legitimate competition, without us-
48. Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs
eV, Case 66/86, [1989] E.C.R. 803, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 102.
49. See BRT v. SABAM, Case 127/73, [1974] E.C.R. 51, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 238; Ex
parte Giuseppe Sacchi, Case 155/73, [1974] E.C.R. 409, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 177; John
Temple Lang, Community Antitrust Law and Government Measures Relating to Public and
Privileged Enterprises: Article 90 EEC Treaty, in 1984 FoRDHAM CORP. L. INST. 543, 561-64
(Barry Hawk ed., 1985). For recent cases involving Article 90, see Gemeente Almelo v.
Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij, Case C-393/92, [1994] 2 C.E.C. (CCH) 281 (Eur. Ct.J. Apr.,27,
1994); Regie des Postes v. Corbeau, Case C-320/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-2533, [1995] 4
C.M.L.R. 621.
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ing leverage, and by its own unaided efforts, a licence could be
granted, but that was not the situation in the BSkyB case.
A second aspect of this case was whether the joint venture
required an individual exemption under Article 85(3), which
the U.K. authorities could not give. They could only have
granted a licence to take effect when an exemption was given.
Such an exemption could hardly have been given as long as
BSkyB was a shareholder.
E. Publicly Owned Companies: Companies with "Special" Rights,
and Public Service Obligations
The media, and in particular television, have in the past
been regulated in various ways. Television monopolies were per-
mitted by Community law for non-economic reasons. 50 Monop-
oly rights and rights given only to limited numbers of selected
companies are special rights that come under Article 90,
whether or not the companies were publicly owned. In addition,
some companies were obliged to provide a range of programs,
and given special rights to compensate them for these public in-
terest or public service duties. Article 90(2) creates an exception
to the normal Treaty rules insofar as the exception is necessary
to enable a company which has been entrusted by legislation or
other official act with the operation of services of general eco-
nomic interest to carry out its task. Serious television, including
news, is a service of general economic interest.
IV. MULTIMEDIA S IMPACT UPON THE BROADCASTING OF
SPORTING EVENTS, FILM CATALOGUES, &
PERFORMANCE RIGHTS WITHIN THE EU
A. Guaranteeing Public Access to Major Events
Several Member States have taken measures to ensure that
major events, in practice mostly sports events, will be broadcast
free-on-air, that is, they will not be broadcast encrypted. This is
partly to ensure that the public need not subscribe to a particu-
50. Sacchi, [1974] E.C.R. at 429-30, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 197-99. In Sacchi, the
Court stated that Member States could "for considerations of public interest of a non-
economic nature" set up TV monopolies, but that the monopolies must not discrimi-
nate, and come under Article 90. Id. At the Amsterdam intergovernmental conference
in June 1997, a protocol to the EU Treaty was adopted on financing for public service
broadcasting. It is not clear if it significantly altered the previous law.
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lar channel to see an important event, and partly to ensure that
the national broadcasting company is not prevented from broad-
casting it.
This has been done by adopting lists of important events
which cannot be made the subject of exclusive rights or, as in the
Netherlands, giving the national broadcasting company, in ef-
fect, some kind of first option on the right to broadcast major
sporting events. Official lists of events, adopted under national
legislative powers, which cannot be made the subject of exclusive
rights do not seem open to criticism under Community competi-
tion law.
The justification for protecting the interests of national
broadcasting companies to get the right to broadcast popular
events is said to be that they have public service responsibilities
imposed on them by legislation which make them less profit-
driven and so less profitable than they otherwise would be, and
so they cannot afford to outbid the biggest commercial broad-
casting companies for the exclusive rights to broadcast major
sports events.
1. Eurovision
The European Broadcasting Union ("E.B.U."), insofar as it
raised EC antitrust issues, was an arrangement forjoint buying of
television rights to sports events, and for exchanging sports pro-
grams and licensing them to non-members. Membership was
open to broadcasters providing a service of national character,
producing a substantial proportion of their own programs, pro-
viding and being required to provide balanced programming ca-
tering for minority interests, and covering all or most of the pop-
ulation of their State. Most were not-for-profit companies.
In practice, these requirements limited, or should have lim-
ited, membership to public broadcasting companies with duties
imposed by legislation. Such companies have obligations that
are not necessarily profitable to fulfill. New wholly commercial
stations are free to concentrate on mass-appeal programs gener-
ating high ratings and advertising revenues, and to limit their
range of programs and concentrate on densely populated areas.
Such commercial stations were not allowed to join the E.B.U.
The Commission authorized the E.B.U. under Article
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85(3). 51 The Commission stated that the system reduced trans-
action costs and benefited smaller members. It led to coordina-
tion of broadcasts by different stations in each country and facili-
tated exchange of programs between countries. The fact that
the system avoided competition between the parties for the right
to broadcast important sports events was not mentioned. Ar-
rangements for giving non-members access to programs were
greatly strengthened, at the Commission's insistence.
At the request of some broadcasters, which had been de-
nied membership, the Court of First Instance annulled the ap-
proval given by the Commission. 52 This judgment is now on ap-
peal. The Court first said that the membership requirements
must be objective and sufficiently precise, so that they could be
applied uniformly and without discrimination to all actual or po-
tential members, as is essential. The Court found that the Com-
mission had not considered this question and that the member-
ship criteria were in fact so vague that it was impossible to tell
whether they were indispensable, as required by Article 85(3).
The Commission should also have looked at the way the criteria
had been applied before the exemption was given, especially
since the existing members voted on the admission of new mem-
bers. The Court clearly thought that the rules had not been ap-
plied correctly in practice.
That would have been enough to invalidate the Commis-
sion's decision, but the Court considered a second issue, namely
whether the idea of a special mission in the public interest is
relevant to Article 85(3), as the Commission stated. The Com-
mission said that the constraints due to having such a mission
justified the E.B.U. The Court equated this with "services of gen-
eral economic interest" in Article 90(2). But the Commission
had said that Article 90(2) was not applicable, and so the sub-
stance of that Article could not "in the present case and without
other justification" be a criterion for applying Article 85(3). The
Court made it clear that the Commission could take public inter-
est obligations into account, but it had not explained why they
51. See EBUEurovision, O.J. L 179/23 (1993). EBUEurovision involved an associa-
tion for lobbying purposes, which did not have precisely the same members and which
raised no competition problems. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XX-
IIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1992, at 84, 137 (1993) (stressing importance of
sublicensing to third parties).
52. Metropole, [1996] E.C.R. 11-649, [1996] 5 C.M.L.R. 386.
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made exclusive purchasing indispensable. The Commission's
duty of impartiality required it to look at how the broadcasters'
public service obligations were supposed to be financed, to re-
late that to the financial effects of the agreement.
The general principle that criteria for membership to any
system set up by agreement must, for exemption under Article
85(3), be precise enough to be applied uniformly and without
discrimination is beyond question. The implications of the sec-
ond part of the judgment are less clear and comments here must
be limited because the case is on appeal. It seems, however, that
the following conclusions can probably be drawn.
The Commission must not confuse Article 90(2) with Arti-
cle 85(3). They are quite distinct. If Article 90(2) is not applica-
ble or if the Commission says it does not need to be invoked, the
reasoning under Article 85(3) must be as full and as convincing
as if there was no question of a public interest mission being
involved.
The Court of First Instance seems to regard exclusivity as
the most important feature of this joint buying arrangement,
and some, although not all of the restrictive effects of the ar-
rangements would be avoided if the agreement did not prevent
the parties from bidding independently.
The Commission accepted the argument for the E.B.U.
that, because of their public service obligations, they were not
able to be as profitable as commercial broadcasters. It had not
explained, however, what this meant in financial or quantitative
terms, or how much the exclusivity saved the members, or how
the joint buying enabled the members together to outbid com-
mercial broadcasters. Joint buying arrangements have several ef-
fects. First, they prevent the participants from putting up the
price by bidding against one another. Second, they make possi-
ble a single bid for the rights to any given event that is larger
than any one participant could make. Exclusivity is irrelevant to
the latter, and the precise financial effects of the public service
obligations are irrelevant if the resulting disadvantage, in com-
parison with purely commercial TV companies, is sufficiently
clear.
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2. Antitrust Aspects of Televising Sporting Events
Agreements about televising sports are increasingly impor-
tant in Europe. They raise a number of antitrust issues.
a. Joint Selling
The first is whether an agreement made by, for example, all
the football clubs or teams in a state to sell the rights to televise
their matches is joint selling which, because it eliminates price
competition between the clubs or teams, is within Article 85(1),
assuming that there is an effect on trade between Member
States. This question arises regardless of whether the rights be-
long to the clubs or to the teams. The antitrust authorities in
the Netherlands, the U.K., and Germany consider that joint sell-
ing by clubs is contrary to their national law rules on price fixing.
The most important argument in favor ofjoint selling by clubs is
that it enables smaller poorer clubs to get more money than they
would otherwise obtain. This argument, whatever its merits,
does not deny that Article 85 (1) applies. There is no exemption
from Article 85(1) for sport or sports organizations in Commu-
nity law, and there is no doubt that sports clubs are for-profit
enterprises to which Article 85 applies, even if some of them are
obliged to use their profits only for sports.
The argument that joint selling helps small, poorer clubs in
socially deprived areas where young people have little to do is
not a negligible one. But it is a social argument that is probably
better assessed by a national competition authority than by the
Commission. The answer might not necessarily be the same in
all, Member States. Pay per view television, in due course, might
anyway mean that small clubs with poor teams receive nothing
from broadcasters.
The question of whether the clubs or teams can join to-
gether and sell the right to televise their matches is fundamen-
tal, in the sense that if this is not permitted the rights to televise
will be dispersed among broadcasters and the price of the rights
will -come down.53 If the event or competition is organized by
53. In the 1996 Dutch Sport 7 case, the Commission made its position clear to the
parties on the setting up of the joint venture and on its duration, sublicensing policy,
and certain other issues, but left it to the national courts tc determine who owned the
broadcasting rights for football matches in the Netherlands and whether collective sell-
ing of them was permissible. When the national courts decided that the Dutch football
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one body which is not an association of enterprises within the
meaning of Article 85(1), this problem may not arise. But it
must also be remembered that Community law does not permit
State economic powers over the organization of sport or any
other industry to be given to the enterprises involved them-
selves.54
b. Right to Exclusive Broadcasting
The next antitrust issue is whether giving an exclusive right
to televise important events comes under Article 85(1). Only or-
ganizers of very important sports events such as the Olympic
Games can make a lot of money by giving non-exclusive rights.
For most sports events, the right to televise live is valuable for
only a very short time. Exclusivity is important to the broad-
caster because it guarantees the value of the rights, makes possi-
ble sublicensing which may be profitable, and tends to build up
audiences which is important for advertising revenue. Viewers
are more likely to pay for channels devoted to sport or to the
particular kind of sport if that is the only way they can -see impor-
tant events.
Whether an exclusive right to televise sports events is con-
trary to Article 85 depends on a number of factors:
* the duration of the agreement, the number and impor-
tance of the events in relative and absolute terms
* how many viewers want to watch the events and whether
any other events or any other sports are substitutable
* whether any other broadcaster has any right to televise any
part of the event, given, for example, by legislation
* how important the events are to advertisers
* whether the same broadcaster has acquired exclusive rights
to broadcast many other important sports events
association had no right to sell all the broadcasting rights to the new broadcasting com-
pany, the other issues no longer arose. In the United Kingdom, the Office of Fair
Trading submitted to the Restrictive Practices Court the question of whether the Pre-
mier League should be allowed, under UK antitrust law, to sell to BSkyB exclusive rights
to broadcast UK football matches. If the agreement was prohibited by UK law, no ques-
tion under EC law would arise.
54. Van Eycke v. Aspa NV, Case 267/86, [1988] E.C.R. 4769, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R.
330; France v. Commission, Case C-202/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1223, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R.
552; RTT v. GB-Inno-BM, Case C-18/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5941, [1994] 1 C.E.C. (CCH)
117.
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" the cost to the broadcaster of televising all the events,
which might be very large in cases such as the Olympic
Games
" whether it is likely that more than one camera team would
otherwise film the events.
i. London Weekend Television
Although there is no formal Community antitrust ruling on
the issue, it has been believed that exclusivity in these circum-
stances is natural and that in itself it does not infringe Article
85(1) unless it was for too long a period or unless it had other
excessive effects, or as a result of the cumulative effects of a se-
ries of exclusive contracts. In London Weekend Television,5" how-
ever, the Commission objected to an exclusive agreement, with-
out qualification.
ii. English Football Asociation
In another case, the Commission allowed an agreement be-
tween BSkyB, the BBC, and the English Football Association,
("E.F.A.") under which the first two companies shared exclusive
rights to broadcast E.F.A. matches. The Commission said in gen-
eral exclusive rights should be limited to one season, but a
longer period was justified because BSkyB was entering a new
market for direct-to-home satellite television.
c. Broadcaster Sublicensing
Another antitrust issue is sublicensing by the broadcaster
who has exclusive rights to broadcast the events.56 A clear subli-
censing policy might reduce the anti-competitive effects of exclu-
sivity significantly, and sublicensing might be imposed by the
Commission as a condition of authorization under Article 85 (3),
to ensure that the fourth condition of Article 85(3) is fulfilled.
But the value of sublicensing depends entirely on the terms of
the sublicenses. Sublicenses may be granted to everyone who
55. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICy 1977, at 73 (1979) (discussing English Football League/London Weekend
Television); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TWELFTH REPORT ON COMPE-
TITION POLIcY 1982, at 74 (1983) (discussing exclusive contracts of opera singers).
56. This was done on the Commission's insistence, in EBU Eurovision, discussed
above, and in Dutch Sport 7, which did not reach the stage of a formal decision by the
Commission (the joint venture company became insolvent).
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ask for them, and excessive prices may still be charged. It is de-
sirable, but not sufficient, that the terms should be known in
advance, and non-discriminatory. If sublicensing is to be impor-
tant, the licensees must get something of real value, namely, the
owner of the exclusive rights must not keep all the valuable
rights for itself, or charge too much for them. Even if subli-
censes are necessary, the Commission would be unlikely to get
involved in determining their terms, which might include pay-
ment, access to unedited material, embargos on live transmis-
sion or transmission at particular times, and the interest and im-
portance of the events sublicensed. There would usually be sev-
eral categories of potential sublicensees. If this had to be
regulated, as a condition for an individual exemption, it would
have to be done by a national regulator, in practice, not by the
Commission.
There are, therefore, practical considerations about the dif-
ficulty of fixing the terms of sublicenses, as well as arguments of
principle, such as should the shrewd acquisition of exclusive
rights give power to charge licensing fees at monopoly levels,
which suggest that if an antitrust problem arises, sublicensing is
a satisfactory solution only in unusual cases where the market
could not work properly if it was fragmented. For example,
some exclusive rights, duly sublicensed, must be given to televise
the Olympic Games, or there would be more cameramen than
spectators. In situations like Eurovision, a buyers' cartel can be
permitted only if it has obligations to sublicense. The argument
in favor of a buyers' cartel is that the market would not work
properly if broadcasters with public service obligations have to
bid for valuable rights against purely commercial broadcasters
without any such obligations.
A duty to sublicense, like a duty to share an essential facility,
creates timing complications for the proposed acquire. If it does
not know what the terms of sublicenses will be, or how many it
will have to give, it cannot calculate precisely how much it
should offer for the right to broadcast the events in question.
After it has acquired the right to broadcast, it has to reconcile its
interest in getting the most favorable terms from its licensees
with its interest in getting the maximum benefit from using its
rights on its own channels. Whether sublicenses are negotiated
before or after the exclusive right is acquired is therefore impor-
tant. This is an argument for determining in advance, for each
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State, and by regulatory measures and not by competition law,
what sports events cannot be the subject of exclusive television
rights, and the terms and number of any sublicenses which must
be granted.
It has been assumed, above, that the restrictive agreement
in question affects trade between Member States and that, there-
fore, Community law applies. The mere fact that a broadcast
can be received in the territory of another Member State, how-
ever, is not enough to make Community law applicable. Addi-
tionally, joint selling by football or other clubs is not in itself
likely to affect trade between Member States unless the clubs are
in more than one Member State, as for example when the com-
petition is an international one. Lastly, if either the owner of the
rights to televise the event, football club, competition organizer,
or whoever that may be, or the broadcasting company which has
acquired the rights has licensed them, or is reasonably likely to
licence them, for broadcasting in another Member State, there is
a sufficient effect on trade between Member States. This situa-
tion is more and more likely to arise, as more and more sports
channels come into operation and need to acquire sports pro-
grams outside the countries in which they are broadcasting.
Yet another antitrust issue may arise if a sports organization
integrates vertically by becoming a shareholder in a television
company broadcasting sport. Such a situation has not yet cre-
ated a serious antitrust issue in Europe, but it certainly could do
so, at least in the case of football and perhaps Formula I car
racing, which constitute markets in themselves and give great
market power to TV stations with exclusive rights to broadcast
them.
3. International Sports, Self-regulation, and Television Rights
In Europe, international sports have been largely self-regu-
lated. Self-regulation of sport, insofar as it concerns money-mak-
ing activities, comes under Article 85, in particular when the par-
ties control market entry or access to important sources of funds
such as broadcasting rights. Problems arise where the parties'
interests in limiting entry into the market or limiting the free-
dom of others to sell broadcasting rights conflict with their du-
ties to allow market entry by qualified participants, such as own-
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ers of stadiums or racetracks, contestants, teams or clubs, spon-
sors, broadcasters launching specialized sports channels.
Problems also arise if there is scope for the parties to dis-
criminate between potential entrants, which might be contrary
to Article 86 in itself, or to use their discretion for unauthorized
purposes. Self-regulation, in particular where large sums of
money are involved, as they are more and more in television, can
be permitted under Article 85(3) only exceptionally and with
very strict safeguards. The whole system must be genuinely in-
dispensable, it is not enough that, if the system is assumed to be
appropriate, it would follow that certain features of it would then
be indispensable. The public interest must be fully protected,
not only the safety of spectators, but also the widest availability of
sports programs to viewers, and the freedom of organizers of
sports events in less well-known locations to promote themselves
and benefit from whatever TV publicity and finance they are
able to attract, even if that is initially only regional or specialized
TV. In general, it is not desirable that parties that would benefit
from keeping a monopoly of TV rights for themselves should be
free to refuse recognition or approval, even ostensibly on techni-
cal or sports-policy grounds, to other events or participants. All
criteria used must be clear and precise. A wide discretion is in-
compatible with Article 85(3), as is a self-regulatory regime
which makes dominance or abuse of dominant power likely.
Procedural safeguards are essential. As well as precise criteria,
there must be a duty to give detailed reasons for all decisions,
assessors must be qualified and impartial, there should be a right
of appeal and a right to judicial review.57
Another way of approaching such cases is to say that Mem-
ber States may not delegate economic regulatory powers on pri-
vate parties58 and that enterprises may not obtain by self-regula-
tion powers which Member States could not, jointly or individu-
57. See generally Metropole, [1996] E.C.R. 11-649, [1996] 5 C.M.L.R. 386 (noting that
entry criteria must be precise); See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EIGHTH
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1978, at 35-36 (1979) (asserting that market entry car-
tels should be under strict governmental supervision, that criteria must be precise, and
that there must be procedural safeguards); Heintz van Landewyck Sarl v. Commission,
Cases 209-215 & 218/78, [1980] E.C.R. 3125, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 134; John Temple
Lang, Trade Associations and Self Regulation under EEC Antitrust Law, in 1984 FoRDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 605, 605-71 (Barry Hawk ed., 1985).
58. See Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven, Netherlands v. Commission,
Case C-48/90 & C-66/90), [1992] E.C.R. 1-565, 615-19.
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ally, validly confer on them. Convenience and abdication of
responsibility by public authorities do not justify violation of
Community antitrust law. International sport will not be harmed
by good quality administration.
A self-regulation system, whatever the details, which has
power in practice to control access to the market, or to control
access to the high-quality part of of the market, or to control
access to TV rights, has to be considered under Article 86 as well
as Article 85. This may not alter the result, but it explains why
the application of Article 85 to such cases must be very strict.
B. Exclusive Rights to Televise the Output and Catalogue of a Film
Studio or a TV Program Studio
An agreement giving the exclusive rights to broadcast the
catalogue and output of a film studio comes under Article 85 (1).
This situation is not like broadcasts of live sports events. A stu-
dio can make money by giving non-exclusive rights to broadcast.
The rights continue to be valuable, unlike the right to broadcast
a sports event live, which is valuable only briefly. With films, sub-
licensing is not usually permitted. Exclusivity is not necessary to
put a value on the rights. Exclusive licences of a studio's whole
catalogue and output are not the general practice in the indus-
try. Unlike the right to televise a single sports event or a con-
nected series of events, which cannot easily or satisfactorily be
split up, different films can be licenced to different broadcasters.
There is no need to licence a whole catalogue or output as a
unit.
This question arose in the case of the German Television
stations' association, ARD, and Metro Goldwyn Meyer.5 9 This in-
itially involved a four-year agreement on TV broadcasting rights
and all new feature films to be produced by MGM/UA during
that period. It involved both joint buying and exclusivity. The
Commission said that the number and duration of the exclusive
rights made access for third parties too difficult. The Commis-
sion finally allowed the agreement under Article 85(3) when
ARD agreed to allow access by other TV stations, with effect only
from the date on which this was ensured, and for ten years, in
59. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINETEENTH REPORT ON COM-
PETITION POLICY 1989, at 68 (1990); Commission Decision 284/36, 0.J. L 284/36
(1989).
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retrospect a surprisingly long period. It is unlikely that in 1989
the Commission saw clearly how television would develop during
the 1990s.' In fact, television is changing now much faster than it
was in 1989.
Of course, as with any other exclusive agreement, the effects
of such agreements on competition depend on the circum-
stances. These are in particular the duration of the agreement,
the market shares of the two parties, the number and impor-
tance of the films involved and their popularity in the Member
States concerned, therefore, language may be important, and in
particular whether the broadcaster has acquired, exclusively or
otherwise, the films of other major studios. Individual feature
films are, to some extent at least, substitutable for one another.
But that does not mean that the whole output and catalogue of
one major film studio is satisfactorily substitutable for those of
another.
The question is important not only in itself but because ex-
clusive acquisition of important catalogues, and to a lesser extent
of new output during the term of the agreement, of feature films
is the second most important method, after acquisition of sports
rights, by which pay-television companies acquire content'and
strengthen their market positions.
Though circumstances vary, in general, Article 85(1) ap-
plies to exclusive agreements of this kind, and therefore Article
85 makes it possible to prevent excessive market power being
accumulated in this way.
In assessing the precise effects on competition in such a
case, it may be necessary to distinguish between programs having
lasting value, such as feature films for cinema or television', and
cartoons, and programs of merely, temporary interest, such as
news magazines, games, interviews, talk shows, information pro-
grams on contemporary events or developments.
As already mentioned, one possible justification for an ex-
clusive licence, provided that its effects on competition were not
too great, would be that it was needed as the economic basis to
ensure that very large new investment would be profitable. This
argument is made by companies investing in digital equipment
for the new generation of TV sets.
As well as creating a barrier to entry for new broadcasting
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channels, concentration of feature film rights in the hands of
the broadcaster eliminates price competition between studios.
Because rights to broadcast sports events are valuable for
such a short time, in comparison with film rights, the market for
film rights is broader, and although exclusivity is harder to justify
its anticompetitive effects may be less than in the case of sports
rights.
The cumulative effects of many exclusive agreements for
broadcasting films is one of several antitrust problems in the me-
dia industry which companies have not dealt with fully. It might
be reasonable for the broadcasting company not to notify one
exclusive arrangement, however, it would be unwise not to notify
a series of them. If they are not notified, the Commission can-
not grant an exemption under Article 85(3), and some or all of
the exclusivity clauses will be void. A broadcasting company with
a series of agreements needs to arrange with the Commission to
notify all exclusive agreements above a certain number or a cer-
tain proportion of all available feature films of the kinds suitable
for its markets. What that proportion should be depends on a
number of factors, which govern the exclusionary effects of the
series of exclusive agreements. Feature films, and particularly
feature films in any given language, are more important televi-
sion content in some States than in others.
But the question is also important for the studios which
enter into the exclusive, agreements, although they are less likely
to be inconvenienced if the exclusivity clauses are invalid, and
although they do not necessarily know how many exclusive
agreements the broadcasting company has entered into. A stu-
dio which would be prejudiced because its contracts would be-
come entirely invalid if the exclusivity, clauses were unlawful
would need to take precautions.
Exclusivity can be more important for a second or third pay-
TV company than for the market leader, because the second
company has a greater need than the leader to differentiate its
programs from those of its competitors.
C. Collective Copyright Licensing for Television
In BBC Enterprises,6" the Commission authorized a standard
60. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1992, at 459 (1993).
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copyright licensing agreement to facilitate retransmission of
U.K television programs to Irish viewers by cable networks and
similar arrangements. Collective licensing by U.K. television
companies and copyright holders was the most effective way by
which Irish cable companies could be sure of not infringing
copyright.
D. EU Performing Rights Societies
Performing rights societies and copyright collection socie-
ties are basically joint ventures with large numbers of members.
Their purpose is to collect royalties and distribute them to their
members, both for performance and reproduction rights. When
members were musicians, it was traditionally taken for granted
that no member or small group of members could do this on
their own behalf, or would find it worthwhile to do so. So it was
assumed that Article 85(1) did not apply to a society, since Arti-
cle 85(1) does not apply insofar as there would be no activity
without the restriction on competition.61
In addition, it is convenient to have a single rate of royalty
on all works licensed.
Another reason for societies was, and is, to combine the bar-
gaining strength of the members. A small group of members
might not have enough bargaining power, or they might not
have a good enough portfolio to offer, and might get no con-
tract. This was particularly important when dealing with a State-
owned broadcaster or other copyright licensees with considera-
ble market power. This, however, is not a reason for saying that
Article 85(1) is inapplicable.
The assumption that no member or group of members of a
society could negotiate licences is no longer true, if it ever was,
of big sound reproduction companies which can and do, enter
into individual negotiations, in particular for reproduction
rights, when the size and importance of the licensee makes it
61. In oil exploration consortia, for example, it would often be impossible for on
company to undertake the expense and the risk alone. See Nungesser, [1982] E.C.R
2015, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278; Remia BV and Verenigde Bedrijveri Nutricia v. Commis-
sion, Case 42/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2566, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 1.
In some Member States, performing rights societies are officially licensed. In such
situations the principle in Ahmed Saeed applies and the licensing authority is obliged to
ensure that it is not authorizing or encouraging any violation of Community competi-
tion law. See Ahmed Saeed, [1989] E.C.R. 803, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 102.
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worthwhile to do so. It seems to follow that as far as such compa-
nies are concerned the main reason for ignoring Article 85(1) is
no longer convincing, and such companies need exemption
under Article 85(3) for their participation in these societies, at
least in their relations with licensees which are important
enough to make individual negotiations appropriate. It is sur-
prising that this issue has not been raised before now.
Certainly there is, and could be, no rule of Community law
which exempts societies, or the participation of major sound re-
production companies in collection societies, from Article 85.
It is also true, of course, that the bargaining power of the
societies, and so of the small right holders who can be repre-
sented only by the societies, is increased to the extent to which
the major sound reproduction companies use the societies for
carrying on individual negotiations, as distinct from merely col-
lecting royalties. This, however, is not enough in itself to justify
an exemption under Article 85(3), and it has no bearing on Arti-
cle 85(1).
1. Reciprocal Contracts
Copyright societies traditionally acquire copyright rights or
ownership from composers, performers, and sound 'reproduc-
tion companies in their own countries. In its own country, each
society licences public performances and production of record-
ings, collects payments, and distributes them to the 'right owners.
Each society also gives one society in each of the other
Member States the right to grant licences there and collect pay-
ment, on its behalf and on behalf of its members. Each society
guarantees that it will give national treatment to the members of
the other societies, and this is required by international copy-
right conventions.
These reciprocal contracts are intended to make all copy-
righted music subject to the same conditions in each State, and
to enable each society to have its members' rights protected in
other States without having any operations of its own there.
The Commission insisted that these reciprocal contracts
must not be expressed to be exclusive. This, however, made no
difference. The self-interest of each society in being a monopoly
for rights of each type in its own State, and the absence of any
pressure to be more efficient, contributed to maintaining the
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status quo, in spite of the broad hints from the Court that
SACEM at least was inefficient, 62 and the strong, indeed unprec-
edented, findings of the U.K. Monopolies Commission against
the U.K. society.63
The Court has made it clear that concerted action by the
societies with the effect of systematically refusing to grant direct
access to their repertoires to foreign users would be contrary to
Article 85 (1) .64 However, parallel behavior is not proof of a con-
certed practice when it can be explained in other ways. In the
absence of pressure, no initiative to improve the present situa-
tion was taken by the societies themselves.' Even if there is no
concerted practice between them, they all have parallel interests
in maintaining the present arrangements.
Pressure came, in 1996 from the U.K. Mechanical Copyright
Protection Society's introduction of direct distribution. The es-
sence of the change resulting from the direct distribution ser-
vice, ("D.D.S."), was that the U.K. Society, acting as a central li-
censing society, would pay royalties which it administers directly
to its member's local rights administrator in each of the other
Member States, rather than through the national collection soci-
ety there. Under the old system, copyright holders paid an extra
commission to those societies, through whose hands the royalties
passed. Direct distribution reduces the time taken in getting the
royalties into the hands of those entitled to them, and reduces
costs and bookkeeping with the apparently inevitable risk of er-
rors in calculations. It, therefore, reduces the previously very
long time during which royalties remained in the hands of the
societies, drawing interest which they apparently retained. At
first, the other societies strongly resisted the introduction of di-
rect distribution. Then, in early 1997, they proposed new ar-
rangements to the U.K. society. Those new arrangements are
now under consideration by the Commission. It seems unlikely
that the Commission would allow any arrangements which de-
nied right holders the substantial benefits of direct distribution.
62. Lucazeau v. Sociaeetaee des Auteurs, Compositeurs et CEditeurs de Musique
(SACAM), Joined Cases 110, 241-42/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2811, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 248;
Ministere Public v. Tournier, Case 395/87, [1989] E.C.R. 2521, [1991] C.M!L.R. 248.
63. UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Performing Rights Society (1996).
64. Tournier, [1989] E.C.R. at 2581, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 292; Lucazeau, [1989]
E.C.R. at 2831, 2833, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 294-95.
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2. Member Treatment
a. GEMA
In the GEMA decisions,6" the Commission prohibited,
under Article 86, a series of clauses in a German society's stat-
utes. GEMA discriminated against residents of other Member
States by denying them votes, certain payments, and by creating
difficulties for German companies with links outside Germany.
GEMA also imposed various obligations which were unnecessary
and made it more difficult for them to join another society, both
exploitative abuses and anticompetitive abuses. This obstructed
the setting up of a single European Market, required the pay-
ment of royalties for works which were not subject to copyright,
and required payment of royalties on recordings already sold in
the Community with the right holders' consent.66 All these prac-
tices were prohibited.
b. SABAM
In BRT v. SABAM 67 the question was whether a copyright
society was acting contrary to Article 86 by requiring assignment
of all its members present and future copyrights to it as a condi-
tion of handling them. It also retained exclusive rights for five
years after a member withdrew from membership. The Court
stated that there must be a balance between the maximum free-
dom for authors, composers, and publishers to exploit their
rights and the effective management of their rights by a society
which they cannot avoid joining. The aim of such a society is to
protect the rights of its members against broadcasters and manu-
facturers of sound recordings. Any obligations not absolutely
necessary to attain this aim unfairly encroach on its members'
freedom to exercise their copyrights. The Court also stated that
a copyright society is not entrusted with services of general eco-
nomic interest under Article 90(2), in which case it might be to
some extent exempt from EC competition rules, because the
65. GEMA, Commission Decision, O.J. L 134/15 (1971); GEMA, Commission De-
cision, O.J. L 166/22 (1972); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST RE-
PORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1971, at 75-78 (1972).
66. This practice was later prohibited by the Court. See Musik-Vertrieb Membran
GmbH and K-tel Int'l v. GEMA (Gesellschaft fur musikalische Auffuhrungs-und
mechanische Vervielfaltigungsrechte), Joined Cases 55/80 & 57/80, [1981] E.C.R. 147,
2 C.M.L.R. 44 [hereinafter GEMA].
67. See BRT v. SABAM, Case 127/73, [1974] E.C.R. 51, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 238.
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State had not assigned any task to it and because it manages
purely private interests. If some of the rules of a society were
contrary to Article 86, it is for the national Court to decide the
legal consequences on contracts affected.
Points to note on the SABAM Case are that it seems that the
abuse was primarily exploitative, an unfairly onerous obligation,
rather than anticompetitive, preventing the members from using
another society to protect their rights, but both kinds of abuse
were involved. The Court concentrated on the word unfair sim-
ply because that word is in the text of Article 86. Another point
of interest is that the Court did not consider Article 85.
After the GEMA decision, the Commission required
SACEM, the corresponding society in France, to eliminate its
rules discriminating on the basis of nationality, to reduce the
length of time for which a member was tied to SACEM, and to
allow members to assign some, and not necessarily all, of their
rights to SACEM. 68 The Commission considered that an author
or composer should be able to put different types of rights into
the hands of different societies in different countries
69
c. SACEM
Greenwich Film Production v. SACEM 7° was about the financial
consequences of sales of films in non-EC States. The case arose
because SACEM required exclusive assignment of copyrights for
the whole world. The Court noted that Article 86 could apply
even if the alleged abuses related only to performances in non-
EC Member States. To decide whether trade between Member
States was affected, one has to look at the competitive structure
in the Community without distinguishing between services, such
as management of copyrights, inside and outside the Commu-
nity. The Court stated that the activities of copyright societies
might have the effect of partitioning the Community.
68. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1974, at 66-67 (1975).
69. See Greenwich Film Prod. v. SACEM, Case 22/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3275, [1979] 1
C.M.L.R. 629; Gesellschaft fur Musikalische Auffuhrungs-und mechanische Vervielfal-
tigungsrechte (GEMA) v. Commission, Cas'e 125/78, [1979] E.C.R. 3173, [1980] 2
C.M.L.R. 177.
70. Case 22/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3275, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 629.
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d. Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten
mbh (GVL) v. Commission
In GVL,7 1 the Commission prohibited, under Article 86, the
German collecting society's failure to contract to collect royalties
for non-German artists unless they were living in Germany. GVL
was the only German society handling performers' rights. The
Commission commented that GVL and artists are entirely de-
pendent on each other. Without GVL, artists could not exercise
their secondary rights, namely rights to payment of royalties
when a performance, recorded on a visual or sound recording
with the performers' consent, is later broadcast or made public.
Essentially, the Commission's decision required national treat-
ment and prohibited discrimination,72 but it did not, of course,
harmonize the underlying rules of national law, and, therefore,
German performers' rights in other States continued to be less
well safeguarded than the rights of non-German performers in
Germany. Following BRT-SABAM, the Commission also said that
a collection society is not an enterprise entrusted with the opera-
tion of services of general or public economic interest under Ar-
ticle 90(2) because it had not be entrusted with any task by any
public authority and it only protected the private interests of
performers.
e. Third GEMA Case
Later, in a third GEMA decision, 73 the Commission author-
ized a clause in GEMA's statutes which was designed to prevent
GEMA members from making payments to broadcasters and
others to play particular recordings. The Commission said that
uniform effective rates of remuneration are important because
some GEMA members are publishers of music who are both
users, paying royalties to GEMA, and recipients of royalties, and
who, therefore, may have conflicts of interest. It is perhaps sur-
prising that the Commission considered that this did not affect
competition, but the rationale that GEMA could be allowed to
ensure that all music was licensed on the same effective terms is
71. Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten mbh (GVL) v. Com-
mission, Case 7/82, [1983] E.C.R. 483, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 645; see also Commission De-
cision No. 81/1030/EEC, O.J. L 370/49 (1981).
72. See Sacchi, [1974] E.C.R. at 409, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 177.
73. Commission Decision, No. 82/204/EEC, O.J. L 94/12 (1982).
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understandable. The decision states that the court is not decid-
ing the issue of whether the agreement concerning the statutes
is prohibited by Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty and could, if
appropriate, be exempted under Article 85(3)," and that the
decision is based only on Article 86.
In another performing rights societies case,7 5 the Commis-
sion prohibited interference with intra-group cross-bor'der deliv-
eries of sound recordings and prevented the societies from bas-
ing royalties on average retail prices of recordings in the country
of sale, rather than manufacturers' published selling prices to
retailers.
In yet another case,76 the Commission prevented GEMA
from charging royalties on all custom pressing work carried out
in Germany when the copyright licence had been issued by a
society other than GEMA itself. Custom pressing is the manufac-
ture of sound recordings by independent firms working for
sound recording suppliers. While licences are needed for repro-
duction of the musical works, the manufacture does not neces-
sarily take place in the territory of the society issuing the licence.
Separate royalties on manufacture in each State would re-create
frontiers by contractual means. GEMA's proposal would have
undermined the principle of the Community-wide validity of the
licence.
3. Treatment of Licensees
A later series of cases7 7 involved disputes under Article 86
between SACEM and some French discotheques who claimed
that SACEM's imposed royalties were too high and that they dis-
criminated improperly between types of discos. The discos fur-
ther claimed that they were refused licences, without justifica-
tion, because of the kinds of music they were interested in. The
Court said that the fact that SACEM's fees were higher than
those in other countries was evidence, but not proof, of abuse,
and that SACEM's fees were so high as to be illegal under Article
74. Id.
75. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1983, at 92-93 (1984).
76. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIFTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1985, at 81-83 (1986).
77. Ministere Public v. Tournier & Verney, Joined Cases 395/87, 110/88, 241-
242/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2521, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R 248.
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86, unless SACEM could explain the difference. The operating
expenses of SACEM were extremely high, possibly due to lack of
competition. The Court noted that the refusal of a licence of
only some rights, as the discos wanted, would restrict competi-
tion if composers' interests could be safeguarded without in-
creasing the costs of managing and supervising the limited copy-
rights so licensed. Whether this was happenining was a question
of fact for the national court to decide.
4. Excessive Royalties
Unlike U.S. antitrust law, Community antitrust law prohibits
exploitative abuses of dominant market power.7" The best exam-
ple of an exploitative abuse is charging excessive prices. This
practice is expressly prohibited by Article 86(a). The impor-
tance of this tends to be underestimated for several reasons.
First, objectively proving a price level that is so excessive as to be
unlawful is an almost insuperable difficulty, and second, the Eu-
ropean Commission is consequently reluctant to launch exces-
sive prices cases. It is convenient to outline the legal rules in
connection with performing rights societies because they illus-
trate all the issues that would arise in any excessive prices case
involving, for example, a dominant broadcasting company. In
practice, in any complex excessive price case, conclusions may
be reached on the basis of all of the criteria outlined below
which are relevant to the facts of the case. It will be seen that,
apart from the well known case law, there are a number of crite-
ria which can be used if the facts make them relevant, and that
the crucial issue is not an academic argument about what gross
profit margin is fair.
The scenario starts with a situation in which one or more
companies are dominant, and, therefore, are in a position to set
prices at levels higher than would be possible in a competitive
market. It is then necessary to look at the facts of each case to
see how far they provide a normal standard or basis of compari-
son against which the monopoly prices can be measured, and
how far they show unreasonableness or an immoderate attempt
to take advantage of market power.
78. John Temple Lang, Abuse of Dominant Positions in European Community Law, Pres-
ent and Future; Some Aspects, in 1978 FoRmnA Coiu. L. INST. 25 (Barry Hawk ed., 1979).
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a. Tests & Evidence of Excessive Price
There are several main criteria or tests used to determine
whether excessive prices are being utilized.
i. Reasonable Relationship
First, in the case law, excessive prices have been described
essentially as prices which have no reasonable relationship to
production costs. 79 This test, however, is inapplicable to musical
works80 because production costs are meaningless with respect
to a creative work. The test of economic value of the services
supplied is no easier to apply. Nobody has ever said what the
relationship, (the maximum gross or net profit margin), should
be and there is at present no rule of thumb which one can use.
Based on the facts of the cases in which the Court has said this,
one can say that a price charged by a dominant company is so
excessive as to be illegal when it is so much higher than the rele-
vant costs that the price could not possibly have been charged in
a competitive market, and especially when it has been based on
factors other than the wish to make a reasonable profit in rela-
tion to costs, e.g a wish to discourage parallel imports, or a wish
simply to charge the maximum which the market will bear. It
follows that Article 86(a) is not capable of being reduced to a
simple percentage of costs, even if the costs can be identified.
The payment must be grossly disproportionate to the value
given, and outside the limits of what is reasonable. In approach-
79. GT-Link A/S v. De Danske Statsbaner (DSB), Case C-242/95, [1997] E.C.R. -,
[1997] 5 C.M.L.R. 601; Volvo A B v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R.
6211 at 9, [1989] C.M.L.R. 122; Bodson v. Pompes Fun~bres Des Regions Liberees SA,
Case 30/87, [1988] E.C.R. 2479, 30-35, [1989] C.M.L.R. 984; Consorzio Italiano Della
Componentistica Di Ricambio Per Autoveicoli v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault,
Case 53/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6039, .14-18, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 265; British Leyland PLC v.
Commission, Case 226/84, [1986] E.C.R. 3263, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 185 ("fees which are
disproportionate to the economic value of the service provided" are unlawful); United
Brands Co. v. Commission, Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] C.M.L.R. 83; General
Motors Continental NV v. Commission, Case 26/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1367, [1976] 1
C.M.L.R. 95; Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda S.r.l., Case 40/70, [1971] E.C.R. 69, [1971] C.M.L.R.
260; Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co.
KG, Case 78/70, [1971] E.C.R. 487, 512, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631; Parke, Davis & Co. v.
Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm & Centrafarm, Case 24/67, [1968] E.C.R. 55,
[1968] C.M.L.R. 47; Nat'l Ass'n of Licensed Opencase Operators v. Commission, Case
T-57/91, [1996] E.C.R. -, 5 C.M.L.R. 129 (Ct. First Instance); Ahmed Saeed, [1989]
E.C.R. 803, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 102 ("excessively high" air fares).
80. Tournier, [1989] E.C.R. at 2553, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 248 (statement of Advo-
cate General Jacobs).
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ing such cases the Court has approved two methods, namely,
cost plus and comparison with competitive markets8'
ii. Similar Situtation
A second test that has been used is that the Court has said
that it is evidence of excessive price when, in similar situations,
one performing rights society charges far more than the socie-
ties in other Member States82
iii. Abnormal Cost Increase
A third method, in the absence of competition, is if a domi-
nant company had allowed its costs to rise abnormally, its prices
might be excessive even if they include only a modest profit mar-
gin. Since there is conclusive evidence that at least some per-
forming rights societies are not efficient,8" this may be impor-
tant. It would also be evidence of excessive prices if a dominant
company failed to make a big reduction in its operating costs
which an efficient modern company would be expected to make,
as a result of, for example, computerization. It follows that it
would be evidence of failure to try to keep costs down, and so of
acceptance of unnecessarily high prices, if a society failed to
make the many kinds of improvements in efficiency which had
to be imposed on the U.K. society by the U.K. Monopolies Com-
mission, assuming that the other society needed to make them.
iv. Increased Royalty Rate
A fourth method that would also be evidence of excessive
prices is ifa society greatly increased its royalty rate over a rela-
tively short period without any comparable increase in its costs.
81. United Brands, [1978] E.C.R. at 301 249, [1978] C.M.L.R. 83; John Temple
Lang, Abuse of Dominant Positions in European Community Law, Present and Future; Some
Aspects, in 1978 FoRDH-M CoRi. L. INST. 25, at 43-6 (Barry Hawk ed., 1979).
82. Basset, [1987] E.C.R. 1747, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 173 (noting that supplementary
performance fee not charged in of origin is not abuse); Tournier, [1989] E.C.R. at 2521,
[1990] 4 CMLR at 248.
83. UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Performing Rights Society (1996).
Advocate General Jacobs said one should look at "the necessary costs of effective man-
agement of performing rights and the need to ensure reasonable remuneration of
copyright owners." Tournier, [1989] E.C.R. at 2559-61, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 248.
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v. Retained Royalty
Presumably, a fifth test would be evidence of excessive re-
muneration or prices if a society retained royalties for an unnec-
essarily long period without good reason, before paying them to
those who are entitled to them, and retained the interest on the
money so retained. This would be particularly likely to be unlaw-
ful if the society had no good reasons for retaining the money
for so long, and by doing so was failing to carry out its duty to
provide an efficient service to its members.
vi. High Rate of Royalty
Yet another kind of evidence of excessive prices would exist
if a society insisted on charging a relatively high rate of royalty
for a substantial category of licensees who did not need to pay
for a licence of more than a small proportion of the works being
licensed, and who were therefore being made, in effect, to pay
for tied products unnecessarily or if a society unjustifiably
charged very different rates of royalties to different kinds of li-
censee.84 It would also be evidence of abuse if the society ob-
tained an unduly high proportion of the revenue of those paying
the royalty.
A more difficult problem arises in the absence of any of the
above kinds of evidence, or if those kinds of evidence, are incon-
clusive. The difficulty arises in particular in industries such as
the media in which remuneration is calculated, traditionally and
for good reasons, as a royalty or share of receipts. How can one
say whether an increase in the rate of a royalty leads to an exces-
sive royalty rate? Depending on the circumstances, various tests
can be used. The rate of return on investment of the society and
its members could be used. They would not, of course, all have
the same rate of return, because a society's members include
both individual musicians and composers and big sound repro-
duction companies. If the rate of return on capital of the society
and a substantial proportion of its corporate members was sub-
stantially higher than the rate of return of other companies in
the relevant part of the media industry, that would be evidence
84. Tourier, [1989] E.C.R. at 2521, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 248. It would also be
evidence of abuse if the society obtained an unduly high proportion of the receipts of
those paying the royalty. Id.
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of excessive pricing. The society would be taking more than its
fair share of the total profits available to the industry.
vii. Relationship Between Profit & Risk
Yet another test, which is relevant to the issue of excessive
prices in media industries, is the relationship between profit and
risk. A price or royalty rate may be excessive if it represents a
high rate of return for an activity which involves little or no risk,
especially when other companies or individuals in the same in-
dustry, or sharing in the receipts of the same section of the in-
dustry, receive lower rates of profits or remuneration and are
exposed to greater risks. In this respect also it is necessary to
look separately at the society, which incurs no risk, and the mem-
bers of the society, which are in a wholly different position.
Sound recording companies take modest risks when they first
produce any recording, as the recording may not be a success.
But they take no risk when they licence the performance of
works in which they own the copyright or performing rights, and
they have none of the risks which are run by individual compos-
ers and musicians. In other words, a rate of royalty which was
reasonable for a composer or musician, who had invested years
in practice and training and who runs the risk of illness or
change of taste or fashion, might be excessive for a sound repro-
duction company.85
Because an unlawfully high price is an unreasonable price,
imposed rather than negotiated, another kind of test of whether
royalty rates are excessive would be to look at the procedures
adopted by the society in question in adopting or changing
them. A rate of royalty is more likely to be reasonable and lawful
if it was discussed and genuinely negotiated with each of the cat-
egories of companies or individuals who will pay it or bear the
cost of it. It is less likely to be lawful if it is imposed on them
without discussion, or if it is discussed only with some of the in-
terest groups involved, in particular if it is discussed only with
the group which is least able to withstand negotiating pressure,
or Which will not be bearing the full economic burden of any
rate increase. It is also less likely to be lawful if it is a single rate
imposed on everybody, rather than a series of rates adjusted to
85. Id., at 2555-6, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 248. Advocate General Jacobs thought it
would be "misleading" to do this. Id.
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the circumstances of each group of licensees, or to each group
of the society's own members.
viii. Justifications for Increased Royalty Rate
A procedural test, which one would expect the Court ofJus-
tice to use or to accept, is the reasons given by a society for rais-
ing or changing its rate of royalty. If convincing reasons are
given and discussed before the rate is changed, the result is
more likely to be lawful. If there is no explanation and no dis-
cussion or negotiation, or if the only reason given or apparent is
that the society thought that the market would bear a higher rate
of royalty, it is less likely to be lawful under Article 86. The fact
that societies act in the interests of individual artists, among
others, does not entitle them to act unreasonably.
ix. Changes in Response to Market Pressures
Another test is how a society adjusts or adapts to change in
the circumstances in the markets in which it operates. This is
perhaps no more than a specific situation involving several of
the tests already outlined, but it is worth mentioning because the
media industry in Europe is now changing rapidly. It is also rele-
vant because computers now make it possible to process royalty
calculations and payments far faster and more cheaply than used
to be possible, and societies have a duty to provide the most effi-
cient service reasonably possible, as well as the most economical.
If a society adapts itself to changes in the industry without grasp-
ing more than a fair share of any new sources of revenue, and if
it adapts its procedures and operations to cut out unnecessary
middlemen, cut costs and speed up payments, it is more likely to
be able to justify its royalty rates. If it does not adapt to change,
e.g. if it continues to base its royalty calculations on out of date
assumptions, and to follow unnecessary procedures, it is less
likely to be able to justify them.
x. Profit Comparison Between Groups
Another test of excessive royalty rates, more important now
than it used to be, is to compare the profits made by the differ-
ent interest groups from different ways of exploiting the same
work. If, for example, the rate of royalty, or the effective rate of
profit overall, on films was very much higher than on videos, and
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if the difference was largely due to the film market being less
competitive than the video market, that would be evidence of
excessive prices in the less competitive market. This again is sim-
ply a specific example of the test, already approved by the Court,
of making comparison with the prices in competitive markets.
xi. Price Elasticity
Another relevant consideration, though a more complex
one, is a change in the price elasticity of the demand by the in-
terests which need licences from performing rights societies.
This is of course different for different interest groups. If prices
were substantially raised after the companies who pay them or
bear the cost of them had invested heavily in assets which could
be profitably used only With a licence from a performing rights
society, and so after those companies had made themselves vul-
nerable to negotiating pressure, that would be evidence of exces-
sive prices. If costs incurred in a competitive market are charged
to customers in an uncompetitive market, the prices in the latter
are likely to become excessive.
xii. Presence of Restrictive Agreements
Another consideration is whether the dominant position is
due in part to restrictive' agreements or whether it is due merely
to the company's ability to offer better products or services. It is
harder to justify a given price level if the dominance is in part
due to restrictive arrangements, even if the arrangements them-
selves may be justified. Similarly, the fact that there is no regula-
tory control of the price charged by a society, if that is the case, is
relevant: regulatory approval would be evidence against exces-
sive prices, and the absence of any control indicates that abuse is
possible.8 6 Under the Ahmed Saeed rule," any national authority
or copyright court determining a royalty rate should consider
whether the rate is so high as to be contrary to Article 86. Unless
this issue has been very fully considered under Community law,
however, the fact that a rate had got national approval would be
evidence, but not proof, that it was reasonable and not contrary
to Article 86. A national regulator might not be applying the
86. Id., at 2550, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 248.
87. See Ahmed Saeed, [1989] E.C.R. at 803, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at 102. The Court
clearly thought that the prices concerned probably infringed Article 86. Id.
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same kinds of tests as the Community institutions would use
under Article 86.
xiii. Arguments Against Commission Interaction in Response
to Excessive Proces
Two classical arguments against Commission action on ex-
cessive prices are that circumstances change and so a ruling that
a certain price is excessive will be outdated in a couple of years,
and that excessive prices encourage market entry and so en-
courage competition. Neither of these arguments is valid in re-
lation to performing rights societies. Their economic circum-
stances change little even when circumstances in the industry al-
ter radically and there seems to be little possibility of any new
performing rights societies being set up which would offer a gen-
eral service and so compete with the existing societies or even of
one existing society setting up on the territory of another.
It will be seen that there is no single maximum percentage
limit on the margin of gross profit, net profit or return on capi-
tal which a dominant company is permitted to make. Different
percentages would be appropriate in different circumstances.
This makes cases complicated, but it also means that the Com-
munity institutions are not involved in determining some ab-
stract ethical maximum price, as is sometimes thought.
When a company claims compensation for excessive prices,
it would have to estimate what proportion of the price it paid was
excessive and unlawful, and what proportion was reasonable and
lawful. The Commission's practice, however, has simply been to
say that the price in fact charged is seriously excessive, without
saying precisely what the maximum permissible price would have
been.""
5. Controllers of Essential Facilities
For many, though not all, right holders, performing rights
societies are the only available mechanism for obtaining pay-
ment of royalties which are due. This means that right holders
have a right to insist on their royalties being collected, on a non-
discriminatory basis, by each society. Citizens of the State in
which each society operates can contract directly with that soci-
88. See, e.g., United Brands, [1978] E.C.R. at 243-47, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 83.
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ety and get the full benefit of its services in that State. Right
holders in other States however cannot normally get the services
of a society except through the society in their own State. This
means that they have to contribute to the revenues of the second
society, something they might wish to avoid. Since citizens of the
relevant State have a right to become Members on certain stan-
dard terms, non-citizens might want to insist on joining directly.
At present they would usually be told to approach the society in
their own State. But the existence of reciprocal agreements, for-
mally non-exclusive, is not a sufficient reason for refusing direct
access, and it is not clear how far there is an), other legal justifica-
tion. The main justification is the administrative convenience of
the societies, that this is how they have always done things, and
this is how they are organized. As their traditional methods are
now said to be out of the date, inefficient, expensive, slow and
cumbersome, it is likely that they will be challenged. Indeed the
only reason they have not been challenged already probably is
that most companies big enough to challenge them are also big
enough to contract directly with anyone who has to pay them a
large royalty, if they wish, and so the inefficiency of the existing
societies does not inconvenience them as much as it otherwise
would.
In the long term it is difficult to see the need for separate
national societies in each Community Member State. A single
Community society could 'achieve the same results more effi-
ciently than the present over-complex structure, and might not
be significantly less competitive.
E. Relevant Markets in Relation to Newspapers
There is a distinction between the market in which newspa-
pers are sold to readers and the market in which advertising
space is sold to advertisers.8 9 In the readers' market, distinctions
have been drawn between trade publications, economic and fi-
nancial magazines weeklies, women's magazines, TV magazines,
specialized amateur and professional magazines, such as motor-
ing, travel, and gardening, and daily newspapers. Such markets
89. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 1995, at 170-71 (1996). See Salonia v. Poidomani, Case 126/80, [1981] E.C.R.
1563, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 64 (discussing newspaper distribution); SA Binon et Cie v. SA
Agence et Messageries de la Presse, Case 243/83, [1985] E.C.R. 2015, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R.
800.
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are almost always primarily national, or at least are areas in
which the same language is spoken. There is also a distinction to
be drawn between serious or quality daily' and Sunday papers
and popular tabloid papers. On the other hand, on-line newspa-
pers compete with traditional newspapers, and individualized
news selection programs compete with traditional press cuttings
and media analysis services.
In CEP/Groupe de la Citi,9° the Commission accepted a classi-
fication of publications by class of readers, and said that a classi-
fication by subject matter on the lines of that just outlined was
acceptable although other classifications were possible.
V. MERGERS WITHIN THE MULTIMEDIA INDUSTRIES:
A CASE ANALYSIS
Up to the end of 1996, of the eight merger cases in which
the Commission had stopped the merger under the EC Merger
Regulation, four have been in the media industry.
A. Types of Mergers
It is useful to distinguish three kinds of mergers in the me-
dia industries which are particularly likely to cause antitrust
problems. First, horizontal mergers are characterized by merg-
ers between actual or potential competitors with large market
shares. Second, vertical mergers, between content providers and
carriers, the subject of other papers. Third, mergers between
companies with market power in sectors which are separate but
converging.
These categories are not, of course, mutually exclusive. The
first type does not require explanation since the issues raised are
similar to those in other sectors.
1. Vertical Mergers
The second type is more common, and more difficult.91 Es-
90. Celex/CEN document 395 M0665, decision dated November 29, 1995. For a
recent judgment on newspapers, in another context, see Vereinigte Familiapress
Zeitungsverlags- Und Vertriebs GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag, Case C-368/95, [1997]
E.C.R. -, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 1329 (noting that prohibition on sale of foreign newspa-
pers publishing competitions is permissible only if proportional and genuinely neces-
sary to preserve media pluralism).
91. The Commission has prohibited several mergers of this type. Commission De-
cision No. 91/130/EEC, O.J. L 63/32 (1991) [hereinafter Screensport/EBU Mem-
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sentially the problem which arises is the extent of the foreclo-
sure effect for other competitors at both the content and the
carrier levels, and the barrier to entry which would result if com-
petitors had to enter the market on both levels at once. Such
cases necessitate assessments of the market power of both parties
at both levels. If the content provider is dominant, a competing
carrier might be unable to obtain enough valuable content in
the appropriate language to offer a satisfactory selection of chan-
nels and programs. If the carrier is dominant, a competing pro-
vider might be unable to find satisfactory alternative broadcast-
ers. Another important question is whether the carrier controls
a high proportion of the set-top boxes or satellites in the rele-
vant geographical market. If so, and unless it can be required to
give access to other content providers or broadcasters, it might
be able to keep competitors from getting access to all the house-
holds which have already bought a set-top box or to the satellites
which they need. In several cases, discussed below and in other
papers, the Commission has prohibited mergers of this kind.
2. Converging Market Places Mergers
The third type of situation, involving companies in markets
which are separate, but converging and becoming linked, has
already given rise to at least one merger of this type which the
Commission prohibited.9 2 The extent and the nature of the an-
titrust problems will depend, among other things, on the nature
of the relationship which is developing between the converging
markets. If for example a book publisher and a video producer
merge, the effects will depend on the extent to which copyright
ownership in each sector strengthens the position of the merged
companies in the other sector, and on the extent to which the
two kinds of products are sold through the same outlets. In the
case of a merger between a telecommunications company and a
television company, the effect will depend on the developments
bers]; Commission Decision No. 94/922/EEC, O.J. L 364/1 (1994) [hereinafter MSG
Media Service]; Commission Decision No. 96/17/EC, O.J. L 53/20 (1996) [hereinafter
Nordic Satellite Distribution]; Commission Decision No. 94/346/EC, O.J. L 134/3
(1996) [hereinafter RTL-Veronica-Endemol] (authorizing merger after withdrawal of
content provider Endemol).
92. Nordic Satellite Distribution can be regarded as being in both the second and
third categories. The Commission has not yet had to deal with a merger in which the
principal issue politically was whether media were becoming too concentrated. The
Commission could look at such a case only under antitrust law.
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in interactive services, the use of TV satellite and TV cable for
telecommunications, and the use of personal computer screens
for showing films and TV programs. Where cable television
companies are already dependent on satellite television broad-
casting, but are capable of competing with a telecommunica-
tions company by using their cables for telephone calls, telecom-
munications and interactive services, a merger between a satel-
lite company and the telecom company could put the cable
companies in a permanent position of dependence and elimi-
nate potential competitors entirely from the telecom market. In
all such cases a series of present and future markets may need to
be looked at, and the mutual dependence of many companies in
the media sectors must be kept in mind. Small companies
caught between two merging companies in converging markets
are no longer able to play one off against the other. The effects
would be particularly serious if the merged companies owned or
controlled a large proportion of the facilities such as satellites,
cable networks, or transponders in the two markets. Even if not
all these facilities are necessarily essential, 9 control of them can
give considerable market power.
So in this third type of situation there may be a variety of
problems. Both content provider and carrier, whether broad-
caster, cable company, or telecommunications company, may be
strengthening their respective dominant positions or extending
them into separate markets through the use of their existing
power.
Second, a joint venture may come into being with a large
market share in its market, due to its parents' power.
Barriers to entry also may be raised because a new entrant
may be forced to enter several markets at once, or at least to
provide a large series of services at once.
Additionally, the joint venture may control a conditional ac-
cess system or set top box which, whether or not it constitutes an
essential facility, gives the joint venture and its associated compa-
nies an unbeatable first mover advantage, set top boxes are ex-
pensive, few households will pay for more than one or replace
93. See generally, John Temple Lang, Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies' Du-
ties to Supply Competitors, and Access to Essential Facilities, in 1994 FoRDHAM CoRP. L. INST.
245 (Barry Hawk ed., 1995).
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the one they have bought, and more services can be provided
through a box, and may become a monopoly.
Each major parent also may have ended the threat to its
market from its principal potential competitor. The Commis-
sion is always anxious to ensure that a company which already
has market power does not neutralize its principal potential ri-
val, the nucleus of any competing group which may emerge.
Another potential problem is that combination may consti-
tute an increased threat to the independence of cable TV com-
panies. Further, the joint venture may go into Internet services,
ordering and banking services, and other interactive services,
with considerable advantages over competitors in those markets,
and creating in turn advantages in the traditional markets.
Another problem is that the parties may be able, in due
course, to use their set-top boxes for a wider variety of purposes
than any of their competitors, thus enabling them to cross-subsi-
dize the price of the boxes.
There also is scope for a variety of bundling and tying prac-
tices, and for predatory prices, a cross-subsidy may be predatory
if an extra service bears only the extra, incremental cost of pro-
viding the service which may be close to zero, rather than a pro-
portionate share of total costs.
Another problem rises in particular in markets in which the
first movers have substantial advantages, it is important not to
allow additional anticompetitive advantages to be obtained by a
merger or joint venture, or to allow the company to obtain mu-
tually reinforcing first mover advantages in several related mar-
kets at once.
Lastly, a problem could arise if the cable network or the rel-
evant satellites are a monopoly, the antitrust problems are partic-
ularly serious.
It will be seen that convergence is essentially a horizontal or
conglomerate phenomenon, distinct from the second category
of mergers mentioned here.
It will be seen that, at least in theory, some, but not all, of
these problems could be tackled, if they arise, by regulatory
measures as well as, or instead of, antitrust measures.
It is not yet clear how many systems of pay-TV and related
interactive and other services will be profitable in each Member
State in the Community. The aim of Commission antitrust pol-
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icy should therefore presumably be as far as possible to facilitate
further entry and to ensure that no unnecessary barriers to entry
are created, and that no group of companies is allowed to in-
clude its main potential competitor.
For clarity, it should be said that extension of a dominant
position into a related market is not prohibited by Community
antitrust law. It is prohibited only when it is carried out by
means other than legitimate competition, such as offering new
or better bargains. It may be prohibited, therefore, if it is
achieved by mergers, joint ventures, obtaining regulatory per-
missions, or abuse of dominant power in one of the markets.
Acquisition of dominance by means other than normal competi-
tion is always prohibited. The question whether dominance,
once acquired, is likely to be abused does not arise under Com-
munity competition law except under the rule that State meas-
ures making a State-owned company or one holding special or
exclusive rights dominant are contrary to Article 90 if they make
it sufficiently likely that the dominance will be abused.94
B. Merger and Joint Venture Cases Within the Media Sector
1. Screensport-EBU
In Screensport-EBU,95 the Commission refused to authorize,
under Article 85(3), a joint venture between Sky Television,
News International and a consortium of broadcasters which were
members of the European Broadcasting Union. The consortium
and Sky were potential, later actual, competitors in the market
for transnational sports channels, and the agreement eliminated
competition between them. The anticompetitive effects were
out of proportion to the benefit from setting up a transnational
commercial satellite TV channel dedicated to sports. Sky had
already announced that it would anyway broadcast sports exten-
sively. The joint venture would have involved a group of EBU
members, with the E.B.U.'s backing, and the most likely main
competitor of E.B.U. capable of creating an alternative venture.
The joint venture would also have had a privileged position, due
to its links with E.B.U., in comparison with its competitors. It
94. See, e.g., H6fner and Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, Case C-41/90, [1991] ECR I-
1979, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 306; Merci Convenzionali Porto Genoa SpA v. Siderurgica
Gabrielli SpA, Case C-179/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5889, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R 422.
95. Screensport/EBU Members, O.J. L 63/32 (1991), [1991] 1 C.E.C. 2092.
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would have extended the advantages of E.B.U. membership to a
company which did not comply with E.B.U.'s membership crite-
ria.
2. MSG Media Service
MSG Media Service96 concerned a proposed joint venture in-
volving Bertelsmann, a leading German media group with inter-
ests in book and music publishing, sound recording and com-
mercial television, Kirch, the principal German supplier of fea-
ture films and TV programming, and Deutsche Telecom, the
public telecommunications company. The three relevant mar-
kets were for services for suppliers of pay TV and other television
services financed through payments by viewers, the market for
pay TV and similar services themselves, and the market for cable
TV networks, in Germany. To operate a pay TV system, a de-
coder, conditional-access technology and a subscriber manage-
ment system are needed. Additionally, since most existing TV
sets are analog, the decoder needs to be accompanied by digital-
analog convertor. Conditional access involves smart cards or
other devices enabling the subscriber to have access to the par-
ticular channels or programs he or she has subscribed for. MSG
would have provided all these services. Pay-TV was regarded by
the Commission as including pay-per-channel, pay-per-view and
near-video-on-demand, by which a certain number of feature
films are available for selection, each repeated at specific times.
A separate market existed for cable TV networks. The Commis-
sion concluded that the joint venture would create a dominant
position in all three markets. In the market for services to pay
TV companies, MSG would become and probably remain the
only supplier in Germany, involving all the companies in a posi-
tion to provide such services. The Commission rejected the ar-
gument that three parent companies, all of which are very large,
would not have been able to enter this market separately. Any
competitor would have had to compete against the combined
advantages of Deutsche Telecom on the telecommunications
side and Kirch and Bertelsmann on the television side. The
Commission also said that if MSG dominated the market for
96. MSG Media Service, 0.J. L 364/1 (1994), [1995] 1 C.E.C. 2509; see also COMMIS-
SION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1994, at
151 (1995).
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services to pay TV companies, this would strengthen the posi-
tions of both Bertelsmann and Kirch in the downstream market
for pay-TV. New pay-TV companies would not be able to provide
the necessary services for themselves, and would have to buy
MSG's services. The program resources of Bertelsmann and
Kirch enabled them to put together different packages tailored
to specific target audiences. They could use technical problems
to delay the launch on the market of programs which were con-
trary to their interests, and could get valuable information
through MSG about their competitors. By jointly operating the
pay-TV structure with the leading pay-TV companies, Deutsche
Telecom would strengthen its position as a cable operator. Un-
dertakings offered by the parties were regarded as inadequate to
avoid the anticompetitive effects of the joint venture, and so it
was prohibited.
3. Nordic Satellite Distribution
Nordic Satellite Distribution97 concerned a joint venture be-
tween subsidiaries of the Norwegian and Danish national tele-
communications companies and Kinnevik, a television and me-
dia conglomerate. The joint venture was to provide satellite
transmission services and distribution services by cable and di-
rect-to-home television broadcasts. The product markets af-
fected were provision of satellite television transponder capacity
to broadcasters, distribution of pay-TV and other encrypted TV
direct-to-home, and operating cable TV networks. The geo-
graphical markets were in the Nordic countries. The joint ven-
ture would have had the right to transmit some of the most im-
portant TV channels in the region, and an integrated infrastruc-
ture for the provision of TV services to the Nordic countries.
The Commission said that through its control over satellite tran-
sponder capacity, its links with its parents as cable TV operators,
and its links with Kinnevik as a broadcaster, the joint venture
could foreclose other satellite operators from leasing transpon-
der capacity to broadcasters. Kinnevik controlled four out of
five transponders. As far as cable networks were concerned,
cable TV operators would have to carry the joint venture's pack-
age of programs and would have to negotiate prices with a com-
97. Nordic Satellite Distribution, O.J. L 53/20 (1996); see also COMMISSION OF THE Eu-
ROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1995, at 173-4 (1996).
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petitor. The parties would have had a single joint Nordic en-
cryption system and the joint venture would be gatekeeper in
distribution of pay-TV. The joint venture would also have fore-
closure effects. Undertakings to reduce these anticompetitive ef-
fects were offered, but rejected by the Commission as insuffi-
cient and too difficult to enforce effectively since they were
mostly behavioral and not structural. The joint venture was pro-
hibited.
The Commission made the following comment in its An-
nual Report on Competition Policy.
The vertically integrated nature of the operation means that
the down-stream market positions (cable TV operations and
pay-TV) reinforce the up-stream market positions (satellite
transponders, provision of programs) and vice versa. Overall
the parties would achieve such strong positions that they
would be able to foreclose the Nordic market for satellite TV.
In this respect the operation to some extent resembles the
joint venture MSG Media Service, proposed by Bertelsman,
Kirch Group, and Deutsche Telecom, which was blocked by
the Commission in the autumn of 1994.
The affected markets are currently in a transitional
phase, since the telecommunications markets were about to
be liberalized and new technologies and services were contin-
ually being developed and some were about to be introduced.
In this situation the decision of the Commission took on a
particular importance, because future market structures were
being defined. The Commission therefore acted to ensure
that these future markets were not foreclosed.
However, the Commission recognized thatjoint ventures
and particularly transnational joint ventures can be instru-
mental in developing the media and telecommunications sec-
tors to their full potential. Furthermore it is the Commission
policy to take new developments into account. The parties
were therefore invited to present a modified project compati-
ble with the Common Market and the functioning of the EEA
agreement.
4. RTL-Veronica-Endemol
The first RTL-Veronica-Endemol9 decision involved a joint
98. RTL-Veronica-Endemol, 0.J. L 134/32 (1995); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1995, at 174-5 (1996).
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venture between a Dutch-language commercial broadcasting
corporation in Luxembourg, a public broadcasting association
in the Netherlands, and Endemol, a TV program producer. The
joint venture to be called Holland Media Groep, ("HMG"),
would have affected three markets, namely TV broadcasting, TV
advertising, and the market for independently produced Dutch
language TV programs, that is, separate from in-house produc-
tions by Dutch broadcasters. The joint venture would have com-
bined the two biggest broadcasting companies, commercial and
public, and the biggest independent program producer, giving
HMG a market share in TV broadcasting of over 40%. HMG
would also have obtained a dominant position of about 60% in
TV advertising market, by coordinating its three channels, in
particular because advertising in public channels was limited by
law. In the market for producing programs, the combination of
the biggest producer and the three of the most important chan-
nels would have further strengthened the already dominant posi-
tion of Endemol. Again, undertakings were proposed but con-
sidered insufficient. The joint venture was prohibited.
Endemol then decided to withdraw from HMG, and modi-
fied its agreement with HMG to reduce the proportion of
HMG's programs which Endemol would provide. RTL5, one of
RTL's channels, was to become a news channel rather than a
general interest channel, and, thus, creating an opening in the
market for an independent general interest channel to enter.
Accordingly the joint venture between RTL and Veronica was
authorized.99
A third case involving the same parties arose in 1997 be-
cause a Swedish company, BS, claimed that RTL had not carried
out its undertaking to convert RTL5 into a news channel as de-
fined in the second decision just summarized.
In CLT/Disney/Super RTL100 the Commission approved a
joint venture to operate a free access general interest TV chan-
nel in Germany using both cable and satellite. Although Disney
has a strong position on the market for film and TV rights, there
99. Commission Decision No. 96/649/EC, O.J. L. 294/14 (1996) [hereinafter
RTL-Veronica-Endemol].
100. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1995, at 170 (1996).
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were other suppliers available to provide content for other chan-
nels.
In another merger, 101 the Commission found that the rele-
vant market was pay-TV, which is separate from free access TV.
This market was the national market in Italy because broadcast-
ing rights are bought on a national or language-area basis, the
rights to broadcast films are exercisable on different dates in dif-
ferent States, the program-mix of TV channels is designed for
national audiences, programs are broadcast only in the State
where the language of the program is spoken, and subscriber
management systems are organized on a national basis. The
merger involved no significant increase in market power in Italy.
In 1996, a joint venture was notified by Telefonica, the
Spanish telecommunications company, and Sogecable, a subsidi-
ary of Canal+, the leading French pay-TV company. The aim was
to provide television and audiovisual services by cable in Spain.
The Commission objected and the joint venture was abandoned.
The Commission believed that the joint venture would have re-
duced competition too much in several markets for telephony,
pay-TV, and cable services. Since the joint venture was called off,
no formal Commission decision was taken.'0 2 This was the fifth
big media concentration to be stopped by the Commission.
In 1996, the Commission also approved °'0 a merger of the
radio and television activities of the two groups Bertelsmann-
UFA and CLT. In Germany, the two groups had 38% of the mar-
ket, and were in competition with the Kirch group, which had a
50% market share, and the public television channels. The joint
operation did not plan to go into digital TV and was to concen-
trate on TV financed by advertising and broadcast as unen-
crypted free access TV, as distinct from pay TV. A dominant po-
sition in the TV advertising market would not be created. Kirch
is the leading supplier of feature films and entertainment pro-
grams for television in Germany, and the parties were unlikely to
obtain a stock of programs comparable to that of Kirch. The
effect of the merger was assessed in relation to free access TV,
pay-TV, TV licences, free access radio, and TV productions.
101. See Commission Notice, OJ. C-129/6 (1995) [hereinafter Kirch/Richemont/
Multichoice/Telepiu].
102. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVITH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1996, 150-51 (1997).
103. O.J. C 364/3, (1996).
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The Commission approved Channel Five, a joint venture to
operate the U.K's fifth terrestrial free access TV channel. Only
one of the parent companies was already in the relevant product
market. Coordination of programming was excluded. The only
market in which more than one parent was present was TV pro-
gramming, and in that market the parties' shares were small. 104
The Commission also approved a merger uniting the U.K.
cable TV activities of Videotron, Cable & Wireless, Nynex and
Mercury Communications, to operate in pay-TV, cable and
Telecoms. BSkyB is dominant in pay-TV and British Telecom in
Telecommunications.10 5
At the end of 1996, the Commission put an end informally
to the use of a joint venture between Paramount, MGM, and
MCA for distribution of films for pay-TV.
In 1997, the Commission authorized a small merger to run
multiscreen cinemas involving Warner Bros., Sogecable, and a
Portuguese company.106
C. Satellite Capacity
In Astra,10 7 the Commission prohibited an agreement be-
tween British Telecommunications and the Luxembourg satel-
lite company SES on the sale of capacity on SES's Astra Satellite
to U.K. television program providers. SES and BT were direct
competitors in the markets for satellite capacity and up linking
services. Under the agreement, SES allowed BT to make con-
tracts with U.K. program providers on both capacity and uplink.
The deal denied U.K. providers direct access to SES, aligned the
prices of BT-and SES, and kept SES out of the U.K market. The
Commission specifically provided that customers who made con-
tracts with BT while the unlawful joint venture was operating
should be able to renegotiate them. This decision was appealed
by BT.
104. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVITH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1996 (1997).
105. Id.
106. 1997-5 E.C. BULL. at 24; see also 1997-1-2 E.C. BULL. at 26 (discussing joint
venture in Poland between CLT-UFA and Universal).
107. RTL-Veronica-Endemol, O.J. L. 294/14 (1996).
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D. Joint Ventures when.Article 85(3) Does Not Apply
Companies which have made a restrictive agreement are not
obliged to notify it, and they are free to act on a notified agree-
ment at their own risk. Only mergers under the Merger Regula-
tion, which was modified in 1997 and is soon to be a wider cate-
goiy than before, require approval before being acted upon. In
some circumstances, however, at least, parties to a restrictive
joint venture or other agreement can be prohibited from acting
on it before the conditions of Article 85(3) are fulfilled. The
Commission may prohibit them from acting on it, or a national
court may do so if the situation is clear enough, or a national
court may award compensation for any loss caused by their activ-
ities before the requirements of Article 85(3) are fulfilled.
This situation has arisen in several cases in which companies
in the media and telecommunications industries went ahead and
acted on an agreement in spite of being warned by the Commis-
sion that Article 85(3) was not complied with.108 It is irrelevant
whether it is the parties themselves or others who can cause the
requirements of Article 85 (3) to be met. In such situations, non-
parties which are suffering loss may need to ask for interim
measures or immediate contractual relationships with the parties
to the restrictive agreement, such as sublicenses of the right to
broadcast sports events, or they risk losing their rights to any-
thing other than damages.
E. Conditional Access Systems: Essential Facilities Under Article 86
The question has often been asked informally in Europe as
to whether television decoding systems, set-top boxes and their
related systems, be essential facilities to which competitors are
entitled to have access, and if so in what circumstances? The
question has not yet been raised directly in any complaint to the
Commission. The answer is complex, depends on the precise
circumstances and on the view which competition authorities
might take of the future of the industry, and may be different in
different Member States.10 9 The following comments concen-
108. See the judgments of the Dusseldorf High Court in British Telecommunica-
tions and VIAG 23, Intercom v. Deutsche Telekom and Atlas GmBh, on December 23,
1996 and April 1997.
109. See Council Directive, No. 95/47/EC, on the use of standards for the trans-
mission of television signals, O.J. 281/51 (1995) (applying only to digital TV). In the
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trate on digital TV.
In its simple form, the argument goes like this. To establish
a system for decoding pay television signals requires a huge in-
vestment, and the company doing it has to persuade a large
number of householders to buy or to rent relatively expensive
equipment. Once this is done, or when it is clear that it will be
done, it becomes uneconomic, or at least too risky, for any sec-
ond company in the State in question to launch a competing
system, and anyway the first one has an unbeatable first mover
advantage. So duplicating such a system is not realistically possi-
ble.
This may sometimes be correct, but the problem is not a
simple one.
A number of facts need to be noted. Set top boxes vary
greatly in price and sophistication. Some are merely decoders,
as well as being devices which convert digital signals into ana-
logue which can be seen on current television sets. Others are,
or soon will be, suitable for use in interactive services, such as
home shopping, home banking, home betting, holiday booking,
United Kingdom, BSkyB has undertaken that its encryption technology will be licensed
on non-discriminatory terms to all users. Conditional access systems are not the only
things which may raise essential facilities issues: access to satellite transponder capacity
may do so also. If all or most viewers' satellite reception "dishes" (parabolic aerials) are
pointed at a given satellite, new channels which wish to transmit by satellite may be
forced to use that satellite. Therefore, the antitrust problem is not merely due to the
cost of launching another satellite, but to the difficulty of getting viewers to switch to it,
and the problem that satellite controllers or owners do not always allow transponders
designated for one national market to be used for another, even if the new market is
more profitable. Competition problems caused by shortage of transponder capacity are
also linked to, and tend to accentuate, competition problems due to encryption tech-
nology. However, transponder scarcity will be reduced or ended by digital satellite
broadcasting. Essential facilities issues may also arise in connection with applications
programming interfaces and telecoms return path, which are components of interactive
services, and the electronic program guide, the viewers' aid to select and find the pro-
grams they want to see. Some interests in Europe, including the BBC, advocate func-
tional separation of essential facilities from content provision. The Commission's no-
tice on access to telecommunications networks does not apply to conditional access
systems, see O.J. C 76/9, (1997) although the principles are broadly similar; see also
Commission's Proposal for a Directive on Legal Protection of Services based on, or
consisting of, conditional access, COM (97) 356. Yet, another issue is whether cable
networks can be essential facilities under EC antitrust law. This question has not yet
been decided because many cable companies are not large enough for their conduct to
affect trade between Member States, and because the issue is or can be dealt with by
national regulatory rules. See Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs Annual Report Com-
petition Policy 1995-1996, at 13-16 (accepting that cable operators have dominant posi-
tions under Dutch competition law, and therefore have "must-carry" duties).
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computer games, buying of shares, video on demand, access to
Internet, interactive language learning and home education, au-
tomatic selection of news items, and options in the ends of fea-
ture films.
Broadcasts may need to be encrypted to prevent rights over-
spill, reception of programs outside the State for which they are
intended and without a copyright licence for the unintended
State. There are also several conditional access systems available
in Europe including SECA, Nabravsion (SECAM), Mediaguard,
Videocrypt, Irdeto, and Viacess. Conditional access is any encryp-
tion and decoding system which is individually addressable. Less
technically, it is the technology which allows TV signals to be
broadcast so that only subscribers can unscramble them. There
are systems such as Simulcrypt and Multicrypt which allow broad-
casts through two or more conditional access systems. Digital en-
cryption systems include SECA, Cryptoworks, Viaccess, and
Irdeto. A number of cable companies in various European
States are introducing a conditional access system which they
hope will become a standard open to every company which
wishes to use it.
To assess the situation fully, it is necessary to look not only
at the conditional access system and electronic program guide,
and the householder's satellite dish, but also at the relevant sat-
ellite position and the transponder capacity available in it. Addi-
tionally, the first conditional access system on the market does
not always or automatically become dominant, and even if it
does, it does not necessarily do so quickly. Many other factors
are relevant to dominance.
One key issue may be whether the conditional access system
includes a common interface. Also, some set-top-box technology
is proprietary and some is not. One of the justifications put for-
ward for proprietary technology is that it is said to be necessary
to subsidize set top boxes to get viewers to rent or buy them, and
it is then necessary, to prevent free riders from transmitting pro-
grams which the subsidized boxes would decode, to have propri-
etary technology.
Finally, a competing encryption technology would be able
to sign up existing viewers of encrypted programs only if they
bought a second decoder, which they would do only if the new
technology give them access to a large range of attractive chan-
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nels. Of course, no second decoder would be needed if there is
a common interface or general licences.
Companies controlling conditional access systems argue
that they have no incentive to reject any channel which would
increase the attractiveness of the complete package of services to
which their systems give access. With digitalization, there will be
a huge amount of capacity in search of marketable content.
However, this does not exclude the temptation to make use of
the control of conditional access systems to obtain exclusive
rights or to put pressure on broadcasters to agree to terms exces-
sively favorable to the system controllers. It would be tying, for
example, if a controller insisted on acceptance of its subscriber
management services as a condition of using its conditional ac-
cess system.
Two issues must be clearly distinguished. First, as a matter
of Community competition law, can conditional access system be
considered as an essential facility to which a dominant company
is obliged to give access, and if so in what circumstances and in
which Member States? Unless the company is dominant, this
question cannot arise. Second, as a matter of regulatory policy
in the television or telecommunications sector, should the own-
ers of any conditional access systems by required to give access to
it? The answer to the second question is outside the scope of
this Article.
A competitive advantage is not the same as an essential facil-
ity. Several conditions must be fulfilled for any facility which is
owned by a single dominant enterprise. The rules on consortia
and joint ventures are broader to be regarded as essential.110
The crucial condition in this context seems to be whether a nor-
mal reasonably efficient competitor following an appropriate
strategy could be expected to provide an alternative facility or
system itself. This is an objective question which does not de-
pend on the attitudes, policies, or weaknesses of any particular
competitor or complainant. This basic principle has several con-
sequences.
First, the hypothetical company must be big enough to be
able to contemplate setting up a facility of the kind in question.
Some markets can only be entered by large companies. The fact
that there are companies which are too small to set up a facility
110. Defining Legitimate Competition, supra note 93, at 283-86.
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of the relevant kind does:not prove that no competitor of appro-
priate size could do it. In particular, it does not prove that no
consortium or group of companies or joint venture could do it.
Subject to Article 85, there are some markets in which entry is
best done, or can only be done, in some kind of partnership,
and the market for conditional access systems, for both technical
and financial reasons, may prove to be that kind of market.
Second, the facility in question is one to which there is a
duty to give access,. under Article 86, only if a suitably large com-
petitor or consortium, adequately financial and objectively ad-
vised, would not consider it economic to invest in a second facil-
ity of the same kind in the geographical market in question.
This might be because that market was too small to support a
second facility, or because the incumbent had advantages which
were unbeatable within the time scale of an objective long term
investor, or for any other reason. This necessitates an analysis of
why the incumbent is dominant, and how long it would take to
overcome the difficulties for competitors which are associated in
the dominance. This would depend, among other things, on the
extent to which other companies, cable companies, content
providers, broadcasters, providers of interactive services,
software companies, computer manufacturers, and network op-
erators, had committed themselves to the conditional access sys-
tem of the dominant company. But the mere fact that capital
costs are large, start-up losses likely, and a return on capital
delayed is not enough in itself to create a duty to give access.
In fact, it seems that there will be an alternative decoder
available for digital cable TV in Europe, at least in some coun-
tries. In 1997, as already mentioned, a group of cable companies
combined to launch what they hope will become a standard de-
coder in most of Europe. This is intended to compete against
digital satellite decoders. It is based on the Viaccess system. If it
is a success, it might have the effect of making existing rival sys-
tems, in the States where it is introduced as the second system,
no longer essential facilities to which access must be given. Sev-
eral consequences of will arise because of this.
First, since conditional access systems vary in cost and so-
phistication, a number of questions arise about what minimum
investment would be necessary for the second competitor, and
what would be the minimum functions which its system would
need to be able to perform, in the State in question.
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Second, if the incumbent's system has functions relevant to
more than one product or service market, as sophisticated access
systems have, it would be necessary for the competitor to prove
that the requirements of Community law were fulfilled in respect
of each of those functions and markets, if it was seeking access to
all of the functions.
Third, one of the difficulties facing a new entrant is that, in
some States, the incumbent has persuaded householders to buy
the hardware for its conditional access system. A new entrant
might therefore find it necessary or at least easier to enter the
market by renting its hardware to householders who already
have bought hardware, since they are unlikely to buy two. This
changes the financial picture, and one would have to determine
which strategy was the most efficient for the new entrant to
adopt. That would depend on, among other things, the relative
merits and sophistication of the two kinds of hardware, the cost
of each, the prevailing rates of interest, the relative attractiveness
of the content or functions obtainable through the two compet-
ing systems, and the proportion of all- households likely to sub-
scribe which had already committed themselves to the dominant
company, and were therefore unlikely to sign up with its compet-
itor.
Fourth, even if there is only one set top box which provides
all the functions in question, it may be in competition with sev-
eral other conditional access systems which together provide all
or most of those functions. To assess the dominance of the sin-
gle box, it would be necessary to look at the cumulative cost and
inconvenience of having several systems, consumer preferences,
advantages and disadvantages, etc.
Another question raised is if there is a duty to give access,
what classes of competitors are entitled to obtain it? In the tele-
vision market alone, there are two distinct groups of companies
which might be interested: cable companies, and other broad-
casters. The Advanced Television Services Directive gives rights
only to digital broadcasters, and this apparently does not include
cable companies which merely transmit programs they receive or
obtain from outside their cable networks. The arguments to be
made on behalf of the two groups are different. A broadcaster
transmitting an encoded program must arrange somehow for
households to have decoders to see its programs: it needs only
access to a suitably programd decoder. A cable television com-
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pany, on the other hand, also needs access to programs, and so it
must have access specifically to the decoder of the broadcaster of
those programs. Broadcasters need obtain only part of the car-
riage: cable companies need content as well, and so they must
prove a different kind of dominance, although in practice only
broadcasters so far have provided conditional access systems for
satellite TV. If there is a legal duty to provide access, what is it
access to? Again the question is complicated, because condi-
tional access systems have, or can have if they are sophisticated,
several uses which. may fall into separate markets. The use for
which a plaintiff wants access may not correspond precisely to
the similar use which the dominant owner provide, and the in-
terface which the dominant company has may not be that most
suited to the plaintiff's need. It is clear that. it would be contrary
to Article 86 for a dominant owner deliberately to design its sys-
tem so that it could not be used by competitors. However, sub-
ject to that, if neither the owner in question or any other owners
of similar systems had ever provided substantially the type of ac-
cess required by a plaintiff, and if that access did not correspond
to a licence, contract, or other relationship within the owner
group or to a difference of tasks within that group, there might
be no right to that particular kind of access. A plaintiff, even if it
has a right to some kinds of access, has not necessarily got the
right to insist on the kind of access which suits it best."' It may
however get what the dominant company's downstream opera-
tion gets.
Another, related, issue is whether access entitles the plaintiff
to have disclosed to it a proprietary operating system of a set top
box, so that it can design its own application program. Probably
the answer is that the intellectual property right maybe'ajustifi-
cation for refusing to grant a licence, but that if refusal to li-
cence is a violation of Article 86, the licence must grant every-
thing which is necessary to end or avoid the abuse. Yet another
issue which has been raised is whether antitrust law can impose
an obligation to disclose proprietary technology so that 'the
plaintiff can use it to design a dual-use decoder. This would take
111. JOHN TEMPLE LANG, THE PRINCIPLE OF ESSENTIAL FACILITIES AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAw 23-25 (1996); John Temple Lang,
Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies' Duties to Supply Competitors and Access to Essen-
tial Facilities, 18 FoRDR" INT'L L.J. 437 (1994).
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the essential facility principle further than it has ever gone, and
probably could not be required on the basis of antitrust law.
Other issues are whether the plaintiff ever has a right to
have a dominant company's decoder modified. This might be
demanded in order to enable the decoder to do the same job as
it already does for the dominant company, and therefore per-
haps to accept the plaintiffs smart card. This seems the mini-
mum if there is a right at all, and would certainly be the remedy
if the decoder had been deliberately and artificially designed to
be incompatible with the plaintiffs' technology. However, there
seems to be no right to insist on having a facility modified to
enable it to provide a different function from that which it per-
forms for the dominant company, even if the plaintiff is willing
to pay for the modification.
Still another issue, which it is convenient to mention here, is
whether the dominant owner of an electronic program guide
can be required to display competitors' programs in some non-
discriminatory way, like an airline computerized reservation sys-
tem. This raises a separate issue, whether an electronic program
guide could be an essential facility.
If dominance is proved and a prima facie duty to grant ac-
cess is shown, possible justifications for refusal must be consid-
ered. As with all access issues, these justifications include the
lack of creditworthiness of the applicant, any insoluble technical
problems which granting access would cause, or the fact that the
applicant wished to broadcast, for example, porncgraphy with
which the dominant company did not wish to be associated.
The basic principle is that if a reasonable owner of the facil-
ity who had no interest in any downstream operation would have
a substantial interest, acting rationally, to refuse access, the
owner is entitled to do so. So if giving access would reduce the
efficiency of the facility or would cause it to be used uneconomi-
cally, access can be refused. There is no duty to subsidize a com-
petitor.
Another possible justification would be the intellectual
property rights of the dominant owner. In essence, the result of
the BBC-RTE-case 1 2 as far as relevant seems to be that for com-
112. Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications v. Commis-
sion, Magill, Joined Cases C-241/91P & C-242/91P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743, [1995] 4
C.M.L.R. 718 [hereinafter RTE-ITP].
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pulsory licensing to be ordered there has to be additional con-
duct, whether exclusionary or exploitative, as well as the simple
refusal to licence by a dominant company. This additional con-
duct can be use of intellectual property rights in one market to
restrict competition in another related market. Probably this
means, in practice, that an intellectual property right in the con-
ditional access system itself, which is licensed to companies,
could not be used to monopolize the downstream markets for
the services which companies using the system offer to house-
holds or individuals. Such a system is only a device through
which services are provided, and it does not constitute or em-
body the services itself. The market with which intellectual prop-
erty rights in the conditional access system are concerned is the
market in which the owner of the system licences it to companies
wishing to transmit data or pictures or to provide interactive
services to individuals who are not, and do not need to be, par-
ties to the licence. The Commission has drawn similar distinc-
tions between other markets in which different buyers were con-
cerned with related, but distinct services. But much might de-
pend on the nature of the patented features of the system in any
individual case.
Access in itself is not necessarily very valuable, it all depends
on the terms of the access agreement. Where the dominant tele-
vision company is fully integrated, it is not particularly meaning-
ful to order access to be given on non-discriminatory terms, be-
cause in a vertically integrated dominant company the terms on
which access is provided to its downstream operation may never
have been formulated, and it might take a complex, time-con-
suming, and controversial cost-accounting exercise to decide
what they were. The Commission may have no power under
Community antitrust law to fix the right price. Its powers are
limited in practice to seeing whether the price of access is not
excessive or exclusionary, seeing that there is no price squeeze,
combining the price for access with a downstream price so close
to the access price that a reasonably efficient downstream com-
petitor cannot make a reasonable profit,'1 3 and detecting any
113. See Commission Decision No. 76/185/ECSC, O.J. L 35/6 (1976) (National
Carbonising); National Carbonising Co. Ltd. v. Commission, Case 109/75R, [1975]
E.C.R. 1193; Commission Decision No. 88/518/EEC, O.J. L 284/41 (1988), [1990] 4
C.M.L.R. 196 (Napier Brown-British Sugar); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES, EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1989, 73 (1990).
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hidden subsidy to the downstream operation of the dominant
company itself. In practice the Commission might well either
leave the matter in the hands of a national regulator or order
access on an interim basis to allow time for all the issues to be
negotiated or determined in detail.
F. Conditional Access Systems:'Essential Facilities Under Article 85
When a conditional access system is set up by ajoint venture
or consortium to which Article 85 applies, as is often the case,
the legal issues which arise are similar but not identical. Strictly,
the main legal issue usually is whether, if the parties do not grant
access, they have the possibility of eliminating competition in re-
spect of a substantial part of the products in question within Arti-
cle 85(3) (b). If they have, they can be obliged to licence as a
condition of any individual exemption. This threshold for com-
pulsory licensing is lower than that for a single dominant firm,
but the obligation, if it arises, is the same, to licence on non-
discriminatory terms. In practice this is easier than under Arti-
cle 86 because such ajoint venture is usually licensing already to
associated or unrelated companies, and the compulsory licences
can simply be in the same terms, in all respects.
Even if granting access is not an absolute necessity due to
Article 85 (3) (b), the Commission may properly make it a condi-
tion of an individual exemption when in all the circumstances it
is reasonable to do so, to ensure that the benefits of the agree-
ment outweigh its disadvantages for competition.
Whether such a duty should be imposed depends, among
other things, on the combined market shares of the parents and
the joint venture in both the relevant markets, on the extent of
the disadvantage imposed on competitors the extent of foreclo-
sure, the extent to which competitors need to cooperate with the
parties and are thus dependent on satisfactory cooperation from
them, what alternatives are available to competitors, whether
membership in the arrangement is really open to competitors,
and on any justification that may be available for denying the
benefit of the arrangement to non-parties. A duty may be im-
posed even if the parties are not controlling a facility that is so
essential that non-parties could not do business without it. Ac-
cess on non-discriminatory terms may of course involve the com-
petitor complying with certain criteria or requirements or mak-
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ing an appropriate contribution to the joint operations: there is
never a duty to provide better terms to non-parties than to par-
ties. It is also relevant to know whether the parties could share
with competitors the same services on the same terms without
lessening the benefits of the arrangement to themselves, apart of
course from the fact that they would no longer have that particu-
lar advantage over their competitor. It is always relevant to ask
also whether the benefits of the arrangements are obtained pri-
marily by the parties, or whether benefits are obtained directly
by consumers as well. The duty to grant access arises only if with-
out it the market would not be competitive, for example, there
would be too few companies left that did not suffer from a signif-
icant handicap as a result of being denied access to the joint
arrangement. It is also relevant how far the joint arrangement
reduces competition between the parties to it, and how far, if at
all it would be possible, satisfactory and pro-competitive for com-
petitors not involved in one joint operation to set up a rival one
of their own which would do substantially the same things in the
same geographical area in competition with the firstjoint opera-
tion.' 4
In particular, of course, as has been pointed out earlier in
114. See ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITIONS, supra note 78, at 43. In a series of Article
85 cases, the Commission imposed or took note of duties or accepted undertakings not
to discriminate against non-parties. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ELEV-
ENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1981, 63 (1982) (IGR Stereo Television-Solara);
Amadeus-Sabre, reprinted in John Temple Lang, Air Transport in the EEC-Community Anti-
trust Law Aspects, in 1991 FoRDHAM CORP. L. INST. 287, 317-22 (1992); COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIsT REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1991, 88 (1992)
(DHL International); Commission Decision No. 91/562/EEC, O.J. L 306/22, 20
(1991); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIND REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 1992, 416 (1993) (Infonet); EBUEurovision, O.J. L 179/23 (1993); Metropole Tele-
vision, [1996] E.C.R. at 11-649, [1996] 5 C.M.L.R. at 386 (citing Metro-SB-Grossmarkte
GmbH & CO KG v. Commission, Case 26/76, [1977] E.C.R. 1875, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 1);
Commission Decision No. 94/579/EC, O.J. L 223/36, 57 (1994), [1995] 5 C.M.L.R.
285 (BT-MCI); Commission Decision No. 94/594/EC, OJ. L 224/28 (1994) (ACI);
Commission Decision No. 94/663/EC, O.J. L 259/20, art. 2, (1994) (European Night
Services); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1995, 82 (1996) (Gas Interconnector); Commission Decision No. 96/
546/EC, O.J. L 239/23 (1996) (Atlas-Phoenix-Global One); Commission Decision No.
96/547./EC, O.J. L 239/57 (1996); Nordic Satellite Distribution, O.J. L 53/20 (1996). In
Nordic Satellite Distribution, the parties were willing to give an undertaking not to discrim-
inate, but the agreement was ultimately prohibited. O.J. L 53/20 (1996). Similar un-
dertakings were also offered in MSG Media Service. O.J. L 364/1 (1994). This is because
a merger which creates a dominant position contrary to Reg. 4064/89 cannot be made
lawful merely by assurances that it will not abuse its dominance.
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this Article, a duty to grant access is likely to be imposed when
one of the partners in the joint venture is a telecommunications
company and the others are carriers or content providers for tel-
evision.
CONCLUSION
In general, it seems that the media industry has not yet fully
understood the implications of Community antitrust law. Agree-
ments which should be notified are not being notified, mergers
which had no chance of being approved have been negotiated,
and practices which appear open to serious criticism are contin-
uing. There are several possible explanations, but the facts seem
clear. Although many of the issues which arise are complex, the
basic principles of antitrust law do not always seem to have been
understood.
It therefore seems certain that the legal issues outlined
here, and no doubt others, will arise again in cases before the
Commission, the Community Courts, and national courts. They
may also arise in proceedings before national regulatory authori-
ties, insofar as they have power to apply antitrust principles.
This Article has not discussed the national case law which al-
ready exists since that would make this Article unmanageably
long. But on any issue which they have to deal with, lawyers
should check the national precedents as well as the cases cited
here. The Commission has already looked at national practice
on televising sports events, and will look at it on other issues
whenever it seems worth while. If the Commission leaves a case
to be dealt with by national authorities, in the expectation that
the result will be substantially similar to what it would be if the
Commission handled it, as the Ahmed Saeed judgment115 some-
times requires, the effect may be that both national law and
Community are applied.
Some of the most difficult antitrust issues, such as on pric-
ing, are more easily dealt with as regulatory issues, by national
regulators, than by antitrust authorities.
It follows that at least some and perhaps all media compa-
nies and performing rights societies would be wise to set up
Community antitrust compliance programs, or to review any pro-
115. See Ahmed Saeed, [1989] E.C.R. at 803, [1990) 4 C.M.L.R. at 102.
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grams which they already have. No doubt there are also poten-
tial plaintiffs which are considering, or will soon consider, their
options, although not all the plaintiffs' arguments mentioned
here are necessarily soundly based enough to lead to successful
complaints.
At present is seems that, at least in Europe, media lawyers
and antitrust lawyers are not the same people, and a strong legal
team may need to include one of each. Community antitrust law
has not yet fully entered the consciousness of lawyers specialized
in other areas, at least in the media industry.
